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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on discrimination and inequality. The first chapter uses a large-
scale randomized audit study to investigate whether socioemotional skills are valuable for em-
ployers in the hiring stage, and whether the signaling of socioemotional CVs can help women
in getting hired. The unique dataset we collect allows us to differentiate the different processes
in screening: long list, short list, and interview invitation. The findings suggest that a small
percentage of employers filter out male candidates when they make a long list, and no gender
discrimination occurs after this initial stage of filtering, including the stage when employers
decide who to invite for an interview. Employers value socioemotional skill signals positively
only when they specifically ask for them. On the other hand, they evaluate the socioemotional
skills signals negatively when they do not specifically ask for them, but this holds only for
female candidates. Using a discrete choice experiment, the second chapter focuses on how to
signal socioemotional skills in CVs, and finds that socioemotional skills in CVs are valuable
to employers in the hiring stage, but only when signaled through costly activities rather than
adjectives. By means of a laboratory experiment, the focus of the final chapter is a different
question, on inequality and its consequences on disruptive behavior. We investigate how the
unequal distribution of monetary payoffs can trigger disruptive behavior against people with
whom there is no previous or expected future contact. We compare an environment in which
reducing inequality is safe for the rich with one in which reducing inequality puts the rich in
a vulnerable position, and we find that inequality triggers the poor’s disruptive behavior to-
wards rich strangers. Moreover, the experience of the same level of inequality leads to a higher
degree of frustration and disruptive behavior among the poor, when the rich can safely reduce
inequality. This behavioral change is driven by a change in the poor’s expectations on the be-
havior of the rich, which are more optimistic compared to the case in which the rich are in a
vulnerable position.
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Chapter 1
Gender Discrimination and
Socioemotional Skills: An Experiment
This chapter is based on joint work with Stefan Hut, Victoria Levin and Ana Maria Munoz
Boudet.1
Are socioemotional skill signals in CVs important in employers’ hiring decisions? A vast literature shows
the importance of socioemotional skills in earnings or employment, but whether they matter in getting
hired remains unanswered. This study seeks to answer this question, and further investigates whether so-
cioemotional signals have the same value for male and female candidates. In a large-scale randomized audit
study, we use an online job portal to send fictitious CVs to real job openings, and collect a unique dataset
that enables us to investigate different stages of candidate screening. We find that a small percentage of
employers filter out male candidates when they make a long list, and no gender discrimination occurs after
this initial stage of filtering, including the stage when employers decide who to invite for an interview.
We also find that employers value socioemotional skill signals positively only when they specifically ask
for them. On the other hand, they evaluate the socioemotional skills signals negatively when they do not
specifically ask for them, but this holds only for female candidates.
JEL classification: J71, C93, J24
Keywords: gender discrimination, socioemotional skills, labor market signaling
1I would like to thank Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Margherita Fort, Macartan
Humphreys, Bengisu Ozenc, Davide Raggi, Tanya Rosenblat, Giulio Zanella, and participants at the ESA World
Meeting 2018 in Berlin, University of Bologna, IDEE Bologna and WESSI at NYUAD presentations for helpful com-
ments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Yonca Toker for her guidance
and help on the psychology literature on socioemotional skills, and Meryem Dogan, Volkan Erdem, Burak Urun and
Merve Dundar for their assistance. Almira Sekerci and Omer Faruk Zararsiz have also helped in collecting data for
this project. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the World Bank. This study is registered in the AEA
RCT Registry and the unique identifying number is AEARCTR-0002326. It is approved by the ethics boards of the
University of Bologna (dated July 3rd, 2015) and the Middle East Technical University (no. 28620816/229). The
usual disclaimer applies.
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2 Chapter 1. Gender Discrimination and Socioemotional Skills
1.1 Introduction
Do socioemotional skill signals in CVs play a role in employers’ hiring decisions? A vast
literature shows the importance of socioemotional skills in labor market outcomes in the form
of earnings or employment, but whether signals of these skills matter in getting hired remains
unanswered. Suppose that a young graduate is looking for a job, and comes across a vacancy
ad with a requirement of, say, teamwork skills, listed along with other requirements such as
education and experience. Should she include a signal demonstrating she has strong teamwork
skills, along with the schools she graduated from, and the jobs she worked at? Furthermore,
does the answer to this question change according to the gender of the young graduate? This
study seeks to provide answers to these questions.
Economics literature has firmly established that socioemotional skills are valuable in the la-
bor market, but whether they are important in getting hired remains unanswered. Numerous
studies show the possession of socioemotional skills has a positive impact on lifetime earn-
ings (e.g., Cameron and Heckman, 1993; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Bowles et al., 2001a,b;
Heckman et al., 2006; Cunha et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2008). It is also quite common
to see socioemotional skills requirements in vacancy ads, and online job search websites rec-
ommend job seekers to include some aspect of socioemotional skills in their CVs. On the other
hand, the usefulness of this advice is not proven as it is not known whether including socioe-
motional skill signals in CVs actually help candidates in securing an interview - if these signals
are not credible, it might even hurt the applicant by signaling an attempt to oversell oneself.
Evidence from the literature is scarce and indirect (e.g., the effect of volunteering activities as
studied in Baert and Vujic´, 2018), with Piopiunik et al. (2018) among the first studies to provide
evidence that socioemotional skills may matter for employers when they evaluate the candi-
dates, although the evidence is collected using an unincentivized survey with hypothetical
CVs. Even if employers do consider socioemotional skills important during hiring, where em-
ployers can get the relevant information on the candidate’s level in terms of her socioemotional
skillsremains unanswered: While they can rely on educational attainment or technical certifi-
cations of prospective workers as signals of cognitive and technical skills, socioemotional skills
are more difficult for employers to assess and for job seekers to signal.
A more important dimension where the literature would stay silent in helping a candidate
in signaling socioemotional skills is telling her what kind of skills to signal and how, largely
as a result of the vagueness in the definition of, and the difficulty in measuring socioemo-
tional skills. There is still no consensus on the definition or the name: “soft skills”, “personal-
ity traits”, “non-cognitive skills”, “non-cognitive abilities”, “character”, and “socioemotional
skills” are all used to identify the personality attributes (Heckman and Kautz, 2012), and in
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practice, the investigation of certain socioemotional skills in the literature depends heavily on
data availability (Brunello and Schlotter, 2011). Perhaps the most used measure of socioemo-
tional skills is the Big Five personality traits,2 and many studies find them important in career
success (e.g., Boudreau et al., 2001; Seibert, Scott E. and Kraimer, Maria L., 2001; Gelissen and
de Graaf, 2006) and earnings (e.g., Nyhus and Pons, 2005; Mueller and Plug, 2006; Heineck and
Anger, 2010). Depending on data availability, some studies use more specific measures such
as misbehavior in childhood (Segal, 2013), leadership positions or behavioral reports in high
school (Kuhn and Weinberger, 2005; Protsch and Solga, 2015), and skills such as locus of con-
trol, aggression, and withdrawal (Groves, 2005), but most of these studies use information on
skills and labor market outcomes for real individuals, limiting the skills measurements to those
acquired before adulthood in order to provide causal estimates for the effect sizes.3 This is be-
cause job experience is not orthogonal to socioemotional skills once the individual has started
their career: A person with high teamwork skills might be likely to get a job that requires team-
work, but working in a team would improve teamwork skills as well, making it difficult to
disentangle the effect of socioemotional skill from that of job experience. An ideal case study
would be the random assignment of socioemotional skills to two identical individuals, which
is highly unrealistic to expect in real life.
Our methodology is an experimental one, aiming to replicate the thought exercise of ran-
domly assigning socioemotional skills to two identical individuals. We have a 2x2 design where
the first dimension is the existence of socioemotional skills signals in the CV, and the other is
gender. For the socioemotional skills treatment, we first carefully define and match socioe-
motional skills for four different occupational clusters, accounting, marketing, sales and IT,
using precise skill requirements from the task definitions in O*NET, the occupation dictionary
widely used in labor market research. We experimentally vary the socioemotional skill signals
and gender in the CV, apply for a total of 2,687 real job ads using 10,748 CVs. We collect a
unique dataset that enables us to investigate different stages of candidate screening.4 The first
stage is on whether the candidate appeared in the list after the employer filtered the candi-
dates using hard criteria (such as gender, education, experience level, etc.). The second stage
includes whether the employer clicked on the candidate’s profile to view his or her CV, and as
in all other similar studies, the final stage includes whether the candidate received an invita-
tion for an interview from the employer. We are thus able to pinpoint at which stage, if any,
different CV characteristics including gender and socioemotional skills, come into play during
2The Big Five personality traits are: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroti-
cism.
3Apart from Protsch and Solga (2015) which uses an experimental methodology with fictitious CVs.
4To our knowledge, the only other study using a similar dataset, albeit with a smaller sample, is Balkan and
Cilasun (2018) that investigate whether gender discrimination plays a role in the low female labor force participation
in Turkey.
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screening.
One particular strength of our design is the matching of occupations and skills, capturing
the heterogeneity of skills requirements for each occupation. If the value of socioemotional
skills is heterogeneous in occupations, an analysis at the labor market based on one specific
aspect of socioemotional skills level would provide biased estimates. In fact, O*NET classi-
fications do point out a difference in daily tasks of each occupation, and hence the required
socioemotional skills. For example, a financial analyst needs to have attention to detail skills,
whereas persuasion is listed for a retail salesperson. In addition to these classifications, conven-
tional job ads also specify the required socioemotional skills along with the tasks expected from
the candidate. The limited availability of different dimensions of socioemotional skills makes
it difficult for observational studies to capture this heterogeneity, but we solve this weakness
with our experimental methodology.
The value of socioemotional skill signals may be particularly important for women, who
experience higher rates of joblessness or long-term unemployment in most countries. While
there is no consensus on the existence of gender discrimination in hiring (see Bertrand and
Duflo, 2017 for a review), there is evidence that the gender wage gap may, to some degree, be
explained by the differences in socioemotional skills between men and women (Palomino and
Peyrache, 2010; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011). Furthermore, gender differences in preferences and
actions are important in labor market outcomes. For example, individuals’ own perception of
“male” traits are linked to entry into male-dominated study-fields and occupations (Antecol
and Cobb-Clark, 2010), and there is evidence that women negotiate wages less often compared
to men (Babcock and Laschever, 2009). Studies also show women are more risk-averse, less
likely to prefer competition, and are less likely to overestimate themselves, whereas men are
more overconfident compared to women (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Ludwig et al., 2017). These qualities may lead to unfavorable
labor market outcomes for women compared to men, not only because women shy away from
asking for more favorable outcomes, but also because employers expect them to have less com-
petitive preferences. Signaling their socioemotional skills may thus be a way for women to
mitigate employers’ potential biases arising from these socially ascribed qualities based on
gender. On the other hand, it may be that the same socioemotional skills are valued differently
in the labor market for women and men, which may lead to more unfavorable labor market
outcomes for women who signal the socioemotional skills that are rewarded for men. To inves-
tigate whether including socioemotional skill signals in CVs might help women in job market
prospects, we selected a labor market with a traditionally low representation of women. The
experiment is run in the two largest cities of Turkey, a labor market characterized by the lowest
female labor force participation and among the highest female unemployment rate among the
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OECD countries.5 We consider the high-skilled segment of the Turkish labor market, where
women with a university degree form almost a quarter of the total unemployed population in
Turkey, although women with a university degree or above makes up less than 7 percent in
population.6
We find that employers value socioemotional skill signals positively only when they specifi-
cally ask for them. On the other hand, they evaluate the socioemotional skills signals negatively
when they do not specifically ask for them, but this holds only for female candidates. Our re-
sults suggest that socioemotional skill signals in CVs by themselves can only improve labor
market outcomes when they are carefully tailored to reflect the socioemotional skills asked in
the vacancies; and that they are not useful in improving the labor market outcomes for women,
at least in the CV screening stage. We also find a slight preference for women when making the
long list, and that gender discrimination does not exist conditional on candidates making it to
the long list.
The following section provides the design and the specifics of the collected data, Section 1.3
provides the results, and Section 1.4 concludes the paper.
1.2 Experimental design and data
The experimental design follows the classic design of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004):
we create fictitious CVs and apply for real job ads. All procedures used in the experiment are
approved by the IRBs of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey and the Uni-
versity of Bologna in Bologna, Italy.
Our treatments are summarized in Table 1.1. We have a 2x2 design where the first dimen-
sion is related to whether socioemotional skills are signaled in the CV: In the first dimension, we
signal socioemotional skills in treatment CVs explicitly through extracurricular activities (e.g.,
participating in debate tournaments to signal persuasion skills), in the job description (e.g., by
indicating that the candidate persuaded current customers to try new products, thus enabled
surpassing targeted sales volume and profit) and in the tagline (as a summary of individual’s
work experience). The control CVs have neutral text of similar length in the same fields. The
second dimension is the gender of the applicant.
Within this design, we first select the details of the labor market we consider, including
5According to the OECD statistics, in 2017, Turkey had the third lowest female unemployment rate with 14.4
percent after Greece and Spain; and had the lowest female labor force participation rate with 38 percent.
6Source: Calculated using Turkey Household Labor Force Micro Dataset 2016
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Table 1.1: Treatments
No Socioemotional Socioemotional
Skills Signal Skills Signal
Male (C , M) (T , M)
Female (C , F) (T , F)
occupational clusters, location and the job portal we use. We then create control and treatment
CVs for fictitious male and female candidates. Using these CVs, we apply for a total of 2,687
vacancies that we collected between June 2017 and January 2018. The sections below outline
these procedures.
1.2.1 Labor market
Labor markets
The experiment is conducted in Turkey, where about 32 million people are currently in the
labor force. We focus on the two cities with the largest labor markets that make up about
27 percent of the total employed population in Turkey: Istanbul (20 percent) and Ankara (7
percent). Around 40.000 positions are available for Istanbul and Ankara each day on average.
Furthermore, we separate Istanbul into two regions, Istanbul-Asia and Istanbul-Europe, since
they largely represent two different labor markets in terms of hiring decisions. The European
side has the largest labor market in Turkey.
Occupational clusters
The list of occupational clusters we have selected for this experiment is given in Table 1.2.
The clusters include financial occupations, retail and sales occupations, as well as technical oc-
cupations. This varied set of jobs allows us to draw conclusions about the role of gender and
socioemotional skills in the broader labor market and to compare effects across occupations
that vary in terms of the type of work done and hence may require and value different skills.
Selection of the specific occupational clusters chosen is based on multiple criteria. The first
is the gender composition of occupations: we have selected occupations that do not have ex-
treme shares of females in employment based on data from the Turkish Household Labor Force
Survey. We also collected vacancy information from newspapers and online job portals for a
period of 3 months, and we filter out occupations that tend to indicate they look for exclusively
male or female candidates in the vacancy ad texts in these sources.
Second, we use occupations that have a large pool of vacancies in the online job portal: the
four occupational clusters that we select encompass around 65 percent of the total job ads in
1.2. Experimental design and data 7
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8 Chapter 1. Gender Discrimination and Socioemotional Skills
the online job portal for the geographical regions we consider. Finally, we aim to use clusters
that have different socioemotional skills use in their daily tasks, based on the classifications in
O*NET and the organizational psychology literature. More information on this final aspect is
given in Section 1.2.2.
Job vacancies
We collect the vacancy ads and make our applications using the largest online job portal in
Turkey, where around 75 thousand companies and 24 million CVs are registered.
Table 1.2 provides the criteria we used in searching for vacancies. We focus on job va-
cancies where the minimum required work experience did not exceed 3 years. Our focus on
early-career candidates is because socioemotional skills especially in the form of extracurricu-
lar activities are arguably more salient in CVs for early-career candidates. On the other hand,
for mature candidates, job experience itself may be a strong sign that makes other signals less
salient.
In terms of minimum education requirements, we mostly focus on jobs that require a uni-
versity degree. However, for the jobs in the sales cluster, we also apply for jobs that consider
candidates with high school degrees.
1.2.2 Treatments and resume construction
Socioemotional skill signals
The selection of occupation-specific socioemotional skills involved two steps. In the first
step, we reviewed the organizational psychology literature and the O*NET occupation descrip-
tors carefully to identify which socioemotional skills are attributed higher importance for the
occupations we have selected. O*NET categorizes occupations using one or more of the cate-
gories ‘Realistic, Investigative, Artistics, Social, Enterprising, Conventional’, based on the daily
tasks involved in the occupation.7
7Definitions for these categories are as follows (from www.onetonline.org): Realistic: Realistic occupations fre-
quently involve work activities that include practical, hands-on problems and solutions. They often deal with
plants, animals, and real-world materials like wood, tools, and machinery. Many of the occupations require work-
ing outside, and do not involve a lot of paperwork or working closely with others. Investigative: Investigative
occupations frequently involve working with ideas, and require an extensive amount of thinking. These occupa-
tions can involve searching for facts and figuring out problems mentally. Artistic: Artistic occupations frequently
involve working with forms, designs and patterns. They often require self-expression and the work can be done
without following a clear set of rules. Social: Social occupations frequently involve working with, communicating
with, and teaching people. These occupations often involve helping or providing service to others. Enterprising:
Enterprising occupations frequently involve starting up and carrying out projects. These occupations can involve
leading people and making many decisions. Sometimes they require risk taking and often deal with business. Con-
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In the second step, we collaborated with a private company that was about to post two
vacancy ads and included our specific socioemotional skills in their ad text. In return, the com-
pany provided the research team with (anonymized) CV information, from which we were able
to obtain the ways in which candidates signal their socioemotional skills (more information on
both steps are provided in Appendix 1.B).
Using the two steps, we can identify and construct realistic socioemotional skills that match
the socioemotional skill descriptors in the literature as well as the O*NET. Although a rather
long list of socioemotional skills are provided in O*NET, in practice, we select three socioe-
motional skills for each occupational cluster based on their usage in real CVs. These skills are
given in Table 1.2.
We signal all socioemotional skills through activities that are done in the context of tasks at
job, or through the extracurricular activities during undergraduate studies. We selected to sig-
nal socioemotional skills through activities and not as mere adjectives as a result of a discrete
choice experiment conducted with senior undergraduate students of psychology and MBA stu-
dents, which showed socioemotional skills are salient in the CV, but matter only when signaled
through activities and not as mere adjectives. More details on this discrete choice experiment
is given in the second chapter of this dissertation.
We include these skills in three different places in the CV: job descriptions within the listed
current job experience, through extracurricular activities during undergraduate studies, and in
the CV tagline that is shown at the top of the CV on the online job portal. For the job descrip-
tions, we create sentences of neutral job descriptions and alternative sentences for treatment
CVs that include socioemotional skill signals, both providing information on the same type of
task done at work. For example, for the IT cluster we include four types of tasks that we use to
create four sentences of job descriptions: tasks related to server, internet, software or website,
and hardware and maintenance. For each of these types of tasks, we create alternative bullets
that define the same type of task. For example, the neutral sentence for hardware-related tasks
would state “Providing support for technical failures with equipment such as PC, printer or
scanner”, whereas the sentence that signals teamwork would state “Working as a team in iden-
tifying deficiencies and supplying the necessary hardware”. We then randomly allocate four
neutral sentences to the Control job description, and one neutral sentence and three sentences
that signal each of the three socioemotional skills separately to the Treatment job description.
ventional: Conventional occupations frequently involve following set procedures and routines. These occupations
can include working with data and details more than with ideas. Usually there is a clear line of authority to follow.
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For the extracurricular activities, we benefitted from the way candidates signaled their so-
cioemotional skills in the reverse audit study as well as interviews with human resources per-
sonnel and a focus group discussion with university placement directors of two prominent
universities in Ankara, Turkey. We generated extracurricular activities from both the real ex-
amples and the good practices suggested by the placement directors and the human resources
personnel. All extracurricular activities were added to the section Scholarships and projects for
the treatment CVs. To keep the CV length compatible and to signal high cognitive skills for our
candidates, in the same section we also added a sentence in both control and treatment CVs
that indicates the candidate was an honors student in their undergraduate university.
Finally, for the taglines, we create comparable statements regarding the current job of the
candidate. For the control versions, we include information that is available in the CV charac-
teristics listed below the tagline, for example, of the form “IT specialist who has an experience
of 3 years in solving problems in software, hardware, internet or servers”. For the treatment
versions instead, we signal at least one socioemotional skill within the tagline as well, such
as: “A determined IT specialist who can coordinate with team members to provide detailed
solutions to server, internet, software or hardware problems”. Examples of alternative job de-
scriptions, taglines and extracurricular activities created in this way are given in Table 1.17 in
Appendix 1.C.8
While we can randomly assign socioemotional skills to vacancies, the assignment of gender
is somewhat more complicated. To ensure comparability across genders, we create duplicate
CVs for men and women that have exactly the same information in terms of all background
characteristics, except name, photo, contact information and the date of birth. The imposed
difference in the latter characteristic is due to most vacancies requiring men to have completed
their compulsory military service at time of application: Military service in Turkey lasts for
about 6 months, and is compulsory only for men, which means that, since regularly both men
and women graduate at the same time of the year, our male and female CVs would have either
the same experience level in terms of months, or the same age on average. We selected to have
the same experience level and opted to have men who are on average 6 months older than
females. How we assign job duration is explained in the next part. When running the analysis,
we control for this difference.
8Note that the signals used in the experiment are in Turkish. Translations provided are for information purposes.
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Background characteristics
The goal in the design of the CVs is to generate CVs that are equivalent except for the treat-
ment variable. We therefore assign the other background characteristics either randomly, or we
make it the same for all candidates within the same cluster and/or location.
Job experience
Jobs are assigned randomly from a set of available jobs and positions collected from online
sources. We assigned the number of positions held so that 75% of the profiles have two jobs,
and 25% have one job.
We assigned the job duration independent from the number of jobs, and by making sure
that males and females have the same average experience level. We allowed females and males
to graduate at the same time of the year and yet allow all male profiles to have completed the
military service. To do this, we used different assignment probabilities of work experience for
each gender, and ensure that average work experience for both genders is 3.25 years.9
Neighborhood and education
Candidates’ residence neighborhoods within cities are selected so that they have similarly
large populations (over 100 thousand, close to 1 million in the case of Cankaya in Ankara),
and similar ratios of votes for the conservative-religious or the secular political party. This was
done so that there are no confounders based on perceptions of political inclination of candi-
dates. High schools are assigned based on neighborhood: We selected high schools that have
comparable entry scores in the centralized national high school entry exam. Similarly, for uni-
versities, we selected large, established public universities that have at least 25 thousand stu-
dents. Our candidates are graduates of Computer Engineering for the IT Cluster, and graduates
of Business Administration for the remaining clusters. We make sure that, within occupational
clusters, departments have similar minimum entry scores at the centralized national university
entrance exam; so that the departments are comparable in terms of quality signals.
Photos and beauty
We also needed to include photos for each candidate since there is no regulation against
including photos in CVs in Turkey and as a result, over 80 percent of all candidates in the on-
line job portal include photos. The photos used in the experiment are generated using publicly
available photos or volunteer face shots of Italian and Turkish males and females aged 22 to 30.
The photos collected in this manner were handed over to a graphic designer, who created sets
9Note that average years of experience increased during the time between CV creation and job applications. See
Table 1.3 for details.
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of new photos using combinations of facial features of different photos. None of the photos
were exactly the same with the real versions, but pieces of several photos were used to cre-
ate fictitious photos using Photoshop. The photos obtained were then grouped according to
their gender, and then two different measures of beauty and attractiveness were collected for
each of the photos: objective and subjective beauty scores. The first measure, objective beauty
score, is the attractiveness score based on the face shape, distance between the eyes and lips,
mouth size and face symmetry, using the golden ratio where appropriate. This type of mea-
surement, which we call the objective beauty score, is on a scale of 0 to 100. The software at
www.prettyscale.com was used for this part.
The objective beauty score depends solely on the placement of facial features without any
reference to details such as hair color, color of the eyes and other features that may affect how
beautiful the person in the photo is perceived. Moreover, whereas the objective beauty scores
do not change according to country, individuals from different countries may have different
conceptions of beauty. This is why we also collected data on a second measure that we call the
subjective beauty score. These scores are the average beauty scores obtained from the ratings
collected through an online survey.10 We then generated average subjective beauty scores for
all photos using the total of 32,676 ratings that we collected through the survey. In selecting
the final set of photos, we eliminated those that have extreme scores on either the objective or
the subjective measure; and obtained two sets of photos that have no significant difference in
mean objective or subjective beauty scores by gender. More details on how we do this is given
in Appendix 1.A.
Other signals
All candidates have a advanced level of English, but we vary the levels of listening, speak-
ing, writing and reading randomly between level 4 and 5, the two highest levels in the online
job portal.
Computer skills are included only for the IT cluster, where we provide a list of software that
is the same for all candidates, but we randomize the order that they are listed.
1.2.3 Data for experimental variables
The online job portal used in this experiment allows us to collect three different layers of
information for each applicant. Figure 1.1 provides the details on the screening stages for em-
10The link to the survey was distributed through the Twitter accounts of the World Bank Turkey and Economic
Policy Research Foundation of Turkey. There was no limitation in access to survey, but both the tweet and the
survey itself was in Turkish.
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ployers in the online portal. The first stage consists of making the long list. In screening the ap-
plicants, member firms can use a filtering stage in which they enter criteria to create a long list
of applicants. For each vacancy that a job seeker applied for, the job portal provides informa-
tion on whether the applicant has made it to this first list. In other words, for each application
of all our fictitious applicants, we obtain information on whether the fictitious applicant made
it to this long list. We create a variable that captures this information.
After creating the long list, employer starts screening the long list. In this stage, the em-
ployer can observe the name, photo, current position and city for all applicants. If interested,
employer can click on a CV from the long list to obtain more information on the candidate.
The job portal provides this information for each vacancy that a job seeker applied for. In other
words, for each application of all our fictitious applicants, we obtain information on whether
the fictitious applicant’s CV has been clicked on. We create a variable that captures this infor-
mation as well.
After clicking on the CV and obtaining more information on the candidate, the employer
can decide whether to invite the applicant for an interview. Like all similar studies, we collect
information on whether our fictitious applicant has received a callback from the firm for an
interview. We immediately reject any interview offers and collect this information as a separate
variable. Note that, among our treatments, gender is visible to the employer in all of the three
stages. On the other hand, they can only view our treatments for socioemotional skills after
they click on the profile.
1.3 Results
The results are organized around two main blocks. First, we consider the aggregate effect
of gender treatment and differentiate the treatment effect for the three layers of information we
obtained through our experiment. We then move to the socioemotional skills treatment and
show the aggregate results, as well as differentiating between genders. Table 1.3 provides the
descriptive statistics for our sample. About 71% of our applicants made it to the long list, 32%
had their CVs clicked on and 6% on average received a callback for an interview. Figure 1.2
provides the distribution of CVs on the three outcome variables.
Our applicants are relatively young (around 26 years old) and all of them have a univer-
sity degree. Average experience is around 49 months, and 26% of applicants spent all their job
experience in one job only. In terms of beauty, 94% of our fictitious applicants are classified to
be pretty according to the website’s classification (see Appendix A for details). Finally, appli-
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Figure 1.1: Employers’ screening process after application
Stage 4: Interview invitation 
Stage 3: Employer clicks on a candidate's CV 
Employer is able to view the entire CV Both gender and socioemotional skill signals are visible 
Stage 2: Employer screens the long list 
Employer observes each applicant's name, photo, current 
position, city Among treatments, only gender is visible 
Stage 1: Employer uses filters to make the long list 
No specific information on candidates yet, but employer can filter using various criteria including keywords 
cants have around 4.5 on a scale of 0 to 5 for each of speaking, reading and writing in English.
In terms of vacancy characteristics, Jobs at the IT cluster are more limited compared to other
occupational clusters, with 13% in IT, 30% in sales, 29% in accounting and 28% in marketing.
Total application size at time of data collection is 549 on average, but increases to over 30 thou-
sand for some vacancies. 87% of vacancies mention the requirement for a socioemotional skill.
Furthermore, most vacancies are from Istanbul Europe region, as expected since the European
side of Istanbul is the largest and most complex labor market in Turkey. 31% of vacancies are
from the Asian side of Istanbul, and the remaining 18% are from Ankara.
1.3.1 Gender
Table 1.4 provides the balance table for the gender treatment. Female applicants are signifi-
cantly younger (about 8 months) by design, as explained in Section 1.2. They also have a higher
level of experience, although the difference is less than two weeks. Also, 27% of male compared
to 24% of female candidates spent all their job experience in one job only. Furthermore, female
applicants have higher objective and subjective beauty scores, although these differences are
quite small. Accordingly, all results for gender comparisons include these five variables as
controls whenever it is possible for the employers to use these variables in their decision (see
below for further explanation).
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Applicant in the long list 10748 0.71 0.45 0 1
Applicant profile clicked on 10748 0.32 0.47 0 1
Applicant invited for an interview 10748 0.06 0.24 0 1
Experimental variables
Female 10748 0.50 0.50 0 1
SES treatment 10748 0.50 0.50 0 1
Resume attributes
Experience (months) 10748 49.17 5.62 37 61
Age 10748 26.41 0.65 25 28
Worked in one firm only 10748 0.26 0.44 0 1
Objective beauty 10748 0.94 0.23 0 1
Subjective beauty 10748 0.50 0.50 0 1
Speaking 10748 4.52 0.50 4 5
Reading 10748 4.58 0.49 4 5
Writing 10748 4.51 0.50 4 5
Vacancy attributes
Accounting 10748 0.29 0.45 0 1
Marketing 10748 0.28 0.45 0 1
Sales 10748 0.30 0.46 0 1
IT 10748 0.13 0.33 0 1
Total application size (100) 10748 5.49 9.11 0 302
Signaled SES required in vacancy 10748 0.66 0.47 0 1
Locality attributes
Ankara 10748 0.18 0.38 0 1
Istanbul Asia 10748 0.31 0.46 0 1
Istanbul EU 10748 0.51 0.50 0 1
Besiktas 10748 0.46 0.50 0 1
Kadikoy 10748 0.31 0.46 0 1
Kagithane 10748 0.05 0.22 0 1
Cankaya 10748 0.18 0.38 0 1
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Table 1.4: Balance table for gender treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Males Females Difference
Ankara 0.179 0.179 0.000
(0.384) (0.384) (0.007)
Istanbul Asia 0.311 0.311 -0.000
(0.463) (0.463) (0.009)
Istanbul EU 0.509 0.509 0.000
(0.500) (0.500) (0.010)
Experience (months) 48.954 49.388 0.434
(5.578) (5.651) (0.108)***
Age 26.767 26.043 -0.725
(0.561) (0.509) (0.010)***
Accounting 0.292 0.292 0.000
(0.455) (0.455) (0.009)
Marketing 0.276 0.276 0.000
(0.447) (0.447) (0.009)
Sales 0.304 0.304 0.000
(0.460) (0.460) (0.009)
IT 0.128 0.128 0.000
(0.334) (0.334) (0.006)
Worked in one firm only 0.270 0.247 -0.023
(0.444) (0.431) (0.008)***
Objective beauty 0.926 0.963 0.037
(0.262) (0.189) (0.004)***
Subjective beauty 0.450 0.549 0.100
(0.498) (0.498) (0.010)***
Reading 4.581 4.574 -0.007
(0.493) (0.495) (0.010)
Speaking 4.520 4.522 0.002
(0.500) (0.500) (0.010)
Writing 4.518 4.508 -0.009
(0.500) (0.500) (0.010)
Besiktas 0.460 0.460 -0.000
(0.498) (0.498) (0.010)
Kadikoy 0.311 0.311 -0.000
(0.463) (0.463) (0.009)
Kagithane 0.050 0.050 0.000
(0.218) (0.218) (0.004)
Cankaya 0.179 0.179 0.000
(0.384) (0.384) (0.007)
Observations 5,374 5,374 10,748
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of CVs on outcome variables
CV sent
10,748 applications
CV in the long list
71.2%
CV not in the long list
28.8%
CV clicked
28.8%
CV not clicked
42.4%
CV clicked
3.4%
CV not clicked
25.4%
CV invited for 
interview
5.2%%
CV not invited 
for interview
23.6%
CV invited for 
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0.3%
CV not invited 
for interview
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CV invited for 
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0.4%
CV not invited 
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3.0%
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CV not invited 
for interview
25.2%
Our first finding indicates that a small share of employers use gender as a filter and are sig-
nificantly more likely to select female CVs when making their long lists. Employers can create
their long list of applicants by entering criteria manually. The criteria can include many vari-
ables, including age, gender, experience, city and neighborhood, sector, occupation as well as
a keyword search. Note that, when making the long list, employers cannot filter using beauty,
for two reasons. First, photos are not visible at this stage. Second, it is simply not possible
to enter beauty as a criterion for filtering. This is why we do not use objective and subjective
beauty measures as controls for this stage. Furthermore, whether the candidate has worked in
one firm only is also not possible to use as a filter at this stage. Table 1.5 provides the results
from OLS regressions, using cluster-robust errors at the vacancy level. Models 1 to 6 show
that females are 2% to 3% more likely to be in the long list. Although small in magnitude, this
systematic difference indicates that employers enter gender as a filter when making their long
list and have a preference to include applications from female over male candidates. Model 3
shows that this result does not change according to clusters. Models 4 and 5 show that employ-
ers with vacancies that receive high and low number of applications behave similarly. On the
other hand, the tendency to filter males out seem to be somewhat less pronounced in Ankara
compared to the European side of Istanbul (Model 6). Finally, the models show occupational
clusters (in particular accounting) and total application size also affect the probability of pass-
ing through the filter and making it to the long list.
Not all employers use the long list as the first stage: 11% of applicant CVs that are clicked
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Table 1.5: Determinants of applicant making it to the long list
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.019* 0.019* 0.022** 0.018* 0.021** 0.028**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Accounting -0.103*** -0.098*** -0.097***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Marketing 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
IT 0.045* 0.014 0.013
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
Istanbul Asia -0.001
(0.019)
Ankara 0.015
(0.023)
Total application size (100) -0.003** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female * Istanbul Asia -0.010
(0.007)
Female * Ankara -0.016*
(0.009)
Female * Acct 0.005
(0.006)
Female * Mrkt -0.006
(0.005)
Female * IT -0.001
(0.004)
Female * Total application
size
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Vacancy and CV sectors
match
0.065*** 0.061*** 0.032 0.033
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant -0.240 -0.245 -0.298 -0.211 -0.267 -0.272
(0.332) (0.332) (0.331) (0.332) (0.331) (0.332)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 10748 10748 10748 10748 10748 10748
R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.017 0.017
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the results from OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the
vacancy level are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy that takes on
the value 1 if the applicant makes it through the first screening and into the long list. Variable Female
takes on the value 1 if applicant is female, 0 otherwise. Variable Vacancy and CV sectors match takes on
the value 1 if the vacancy is in the same sector with applicant’s current or previous sectors. Variables
Accounting, Marketing and IT denote the occupation clusters of vacancies (and so of applicants), and
the baseline category is sales occupations. Variable Total application size denotes the total number of
applications for the vacancy. Individual characteristics include experience in months and age in years,
calculated at time of application. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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on are CVs that are not in the long list. This is why we consider both unconditional regressions
and regressions conditional on applicant CV being in the long list when looking at the deter-
minants of what makes an employer click on a CV. Note that in this stage, applicant’s photo is
visible to the employer, and therefore we control for subjective and objective beauty measures
in all models. Unconditional regressions are shown in Table 1.6. A similar result to the case
with long list emerges in this case, where female applicants are significantly more likely to be
clicked on compared to their male counterparts. On the other hand, this tendency seems to be
more a feature for sales and accounting occupations: Model 3 shows that the effect disappears
for marketing and IT clusters. While there seems to be no difference in behavior according to
local labor markets, models 2, 4, 5 and 6 show that applicants that are in the same sector with
the firm opening the vacancy are more likely to be clicked on by the employers. Finally, as
the total application size increases, employers presumably have more CVs to go through and
the probability of a particular CV being clicked on gets smaller. In these cases, female CVs are
slightly less likely to be clicked on (Models 4 and 5).
Table 1.7 shows the determinants of applicant CV being clicked on, this time conditional
to the applicant making it to the long list first.11 Results show that, once they make it to the
long list, females and males are equally likely to be clicked on, and factors other than gender,
such as the type of occupation, total application size for the vacancy and whether the sector of
applicant and firm matches affect click behavior.
We now move to the final component of our analysis for the gender treatment, callbacks for
an interview. Note that 8% of our applicants that are invited for an interview are those whose
CVs are not clicked on by the employer before, which is why we present our results in this
part both unconditionally and conditional on the applicant’s CV being clicked. Our findings
show no gender difference in being invited for an interview, both unconditionally and con-
ditional on the applicant CV being clicked on. Table 1.8 provides the correspondence table.
Overall, around 7.5% of females compared to 4.2% of males are invited for an interview, indi-
cating a preference for female over male candidates. However, this result may be affected by
the remaining imbalances, which is why we look at the regression results. Tables 1.9 and 1.10
provide the regression results, both unconditionally and conditional on applicant’s CV being
clicked on, respectively.12 Both tables show that there is no significant gender effect in the prob-
ability of being invited for an interview. Model 3 in both tables show that the insignificance of
gender holds through different occupational clusters, apart from a small positive effect of be-
ing female for the sales occupations, significant at 10%, when the regressions are unconditional
11Conditional balance tables are provided in Appendix 1.D.
12Conditional balance tables are provided in Appendix 1.D.
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Table 1.6: Determinants of applicant’s CV being clicked on
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.023* 0.023** 0.026** 0.028** 0.031** 0.031**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Accounting -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.121***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Marketing -0.064*** -0.074*** -0.074***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
IT 0.208*** 0.152*** 0.150***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
Istanbul Asia 0.010
(0.018)
Ankara 0.011
(0.022)
Total application size (100) -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female * Istanbul Asia -0.015
(0.016)
Female * Ankara -0.008
(0.019)
Female * Acct -0.001
(0.009)
Female * Mrkt -0.019*
(0.010)
Female * IT -0.025*
(0.015)
Female * Total application
size
-0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
Vacancy and CV sectors
match
0.200*** 0.195*** 0.047** 0.047**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant 0.421 0.400 0.398 0.449 0.442 0.430
(0.317) (0.313) (0.309) (0.311) (0.308) (0.310)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 10748 10748 10748 10748 10748 10748
R-squared 0.001 0.025 0.047 0.030 0.051 0.051
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the results from OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the
vacancy level are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy that takes
on the value 1 if the applicant’s CV is clicked on. Variable Female takes on the value 1 if applicant is
female, 0 otherwise. Variable Vacancy and CV sectors match takes on the value 1 if the vacancy is in
the same sector with applicant’s current or previous sectors. Variables Accounting, Marketing and IT
denote the occupation clusters of vacancies (and so of applicants), and the baseline category is sales
occupations. Variable Total application size denotes the total number of applications for the vacancy.
Individual characteristics include experience in months, age in years, objective and subjective beauty
score measures. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Determinants of applicant’s CV being clicked on, conditional on applicant making it
to the long list
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.022 0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Accounting -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.091***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Marketing -0.063*** -0.071*** -0.071***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
IT 0.238*** 0.171*** 0.169***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.036)
Istanbul Asia 0.012
(0.023)
Ankara 0.012
(0.026)
Total application size (100) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female * Istanbul Asia -0.028
(0.021)
Female * Ankara 0.001
(0.025)
Female * Acct -0.004
(0.013)
Female * Mrkt -0.017
(0.013)
Female * IT -0.018
(0.017)
Female * Total application
size
-0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Vacancy and CV sectors
match
0.227*** 0.221*** 0.066** 0.066**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 0.990** 0.941** 0.972*** 1.010*** 1.029*** 1.028***
(0.385) (0.378) (0.374) (0.376) (0.372) (0.376)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 7654 7654 7654 7654 7654 7654
R-squared 0.002 0.031 0.048 0.036 0.052 0.052
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the results from OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the
vacancy level are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy that takes
on the value 1 if the applicant’s CV is clicked on. Variable Female takes on the value 1 if applicant is
female, 0 otherwise. Variable Vacancy and CV sectors match takes on the value 1 if the vacancy is in
the same sector with applicant’s current or previous sectors. Variables Accounting, Marketing and IT
denote the occupation clusters of vacancies (and so of applicants), and the baseline category is sales
occupations. Variable Total application size denotes the total number of applications for the vacancy.
Individual characteristics include experience in months, age in years, objective and subjective beauty
score measures. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Correspondence table for gender treatment on callbacks for an interview
Equal treatment Females favored Males favored
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0M 0F 2313 86.08 0M 1F 124 4.61 1M 0F 76 2.83
1M 1F 28 1.04 0M 2F 45 1.67 2M 0F 21 0.78
2M 2F 34 1.27 1M 2F 31 1.15 2M 1F 15 0.56
Total 2375 88.39 Total 200 7.44 Total 112 4.17
(Model 3 in Table 1.9). This effect disappears when conditioning on whether the CV is clicked
on. On the other hand, although the interaction of female with the accounting cluster has a
slightly significant coefficient in both tables, joint significance tests show that the effect for the
accounting cluster is not significant, either.
Local labor markets respond differently to our gender treatment: In Istanbul Asia, females
are significantly more likely to be invited for an interview, both unconditionally and condi-
tional on their CV being clicked on. Overall, both of Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show that factors other
than gender have an effect on the probability of being invited for an interview. Applicants for
occupations in accounting and marketing are significantly less likely to be invited for an inter-
view, while the same holds in Istanbul Asia compared to Istanbul Europe.
The findings for the three stages above lead us to the main result of this part:
Result 1. Employers show their preferences for female applicants when they make their initial long list
for screening. Once applicants pass through this first stage, employers do not differentiate between the
two genders at least until the interview phase.
1.3.2 Socioemotional skills
Table 1.11 provides the balance table for our socioemotional skills treatment. Results indi-
cate that randomization has done a fairly good job in generating subsamples that are similar to
each other apart from the treatment. In addition, a joint significance test provides an F-statistic
of 0.47, implying that variables do not jointly affect the treatment variable.
Our socioemotional skills treatment is visible only when the applicant’s CV is clicked. This
is why we only consider the treatment effect on callbacks for an interview and not the earlier
stages of screening. Table 1.12 shows the results from OLS regressions using cluster-robust
standard errors at the vacancy level. Model 1 shows an overall insignificant treatment effect
for socio-emotional skills treatment. On the other hand, we get a differential result by inter-
acting the treatment variable with a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the vacancy
asks for the skill we signal in treatment CVs. Models 2 to 5 show that employers evaluate a
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Table 1.9: Determinants of applicant being invited for an interview
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.010 0.010 0.011* 0.010 0.011 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Vacancy and CV sectors
match
0.022** 0.021** -0.006 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Female * Acct -0.010*
(0.005)
Female * Mrkt 0.001
(0.006)
Female * IT 0.009
(0.011)
Accounting -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Marketing -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
IT 0.002 0.011 0.011
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Total application size (100) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female * Istanbul Asia 0.016*
(0.009)
Female * Ankara -0.007
(0.012)
Istanbul Asia -0.015*
(0.008)
Ankara -0.002
(0.011)
Constant 0.391** 0.388** 0.409*** 0.394** 0.414*** 0.424***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 10748 10748 10748 10748 10748 10748
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.013
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the results from OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the
vacancy level are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy that takes on
the value 1 if the applicant is invited for an interview. Variable Female takes on the value 1 if applicant
is female, 0 otherwise. Variable Vacancy and CV sectors match takes on the value 1 if the vacancy is in
the same sector with applicant’s current or previous sectors. Variables Accounting, Marketing and IT
denote the occupation clusters of vacancies (and so of applicants), and the baseline category is sales
occupations. Variable Total application size denotes the total number of applications for the vacancy.
Individual characteristics include experience in months, age in years, whether the candidate worked
in one job only, and objective and subjective beauty score measures. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Determinants of applicant being invited for an interview, conditional on applicant’s
CV clicked
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.023 0.008
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Vacancy and CV sectors
match
-0.029 -0.027 -0.041 -0.041
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027)
Female * Acct -0.038*
(0.020)
Female * Mrkt 0.014
(0.020)
Female * IT 0.032
(0.020)
Accounting -0.055** -0.078*** -0.076***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Marketing -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.076***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
IT -0.077*** -0.026 -0.024
(0.027) (0.035) (0.035)
Total application size (100) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female * Istanbul Asia 0.064**
(0.027)
Female * Ankara -0.027
(0.031)
Istanbul Asia -0.051**
(0.022)
Ankara -0.008
(0.029)
Constant 0.935** 0.939** 0.976** 0.896** 0.941** 0.972**
(0.428) (0.428) (0.424) (0.429) (0.426) (0.428)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 3469 3469 3469 3469 3469 3469
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.015 0.018
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the results from OLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the
vacancy level are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy that takes on
the value 1 if the applicant is invited for an interview. Variable Female takes on the value 1 if applicant
is female, 0 otherwise. Variable Vacancy and CV sectors match takes on the value 1 if the vacancy is in
the same sector with applicant’s current or previous sectors. Variables Accounting, Marketing and IT
denote the occupation clusters of vacancies (and so of applicants), and the baseline category is sales
occupations. Variable Total application size denotes the total number of applications for the vacancy.
Individual characteristics include experience in months, age in years, whether the candidate worked
in one job only, and objective and subjective beauty score measures. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
1.3. Results 25
Table 1.11: Balance table for socioemotional skills treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treatment Difference
Ankara 0.179 0.179 0.000
(0.384) (0.384) (0.007)
Istanbul Asia 0.311 0.311 0.000
(0.463) (0.463) (0.009)
Istanbul EU 0.509 0.509 0.000
(0.500) (0.500) (0.010)
Experience (months) 49.234 49.109 -0.125
(5.563) (5.673) (0.108)
Age 26.411 26.399 -0.012
(0.643) (0.650) (0.012)
Accounting 0.292 0.292 -0.000
(0.455) (0.455) (0.009)
Marketing 0.276 0.276 0.000
(0.447) (0.447) (0.009)
Sales 0.304 0.304 -0.000
(0.460) (0.460) (0.009)
IT 0.128 0.128 -0.000
(0.334) (0.334) (0.006)
Worked in one firm only 0.253 0.264 0.011
(0.435) (0.441) (0.008)
Objective beauty 0.943 0.945 0.002
(0.231) (0.227) (0.004)
Subjective beauty 0.506 0.493 -0.012
(0.500) (0.500) (0.010)
Reading 4.582 4.573 -0.009
(0.493) (0.495) (0.010)
Speaking 4.517 4.526 0.009
(0.500) (0.499) (0.010)
Writing 4.514 4.512 -0.001
(0.500) (0.500) (0.010)
Besiktas 0.460 0.460 -0.000
(0.498) (0.498) (0.010)
Kadikoy 0.311 0.311 0.000
(0.463) (0.463) (0.009)
Kagithane 0.050 0.050 -0.000
(0.218) (0.218) (0.004)
Cankaya 0.179 0.179 0.000
(0.384) (0.384) (0.007)
Observations 5,374 5,374 10,748
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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socioemotional skill signal negatively when not asked for in the vacancy, although this effect
is not robust. Including the signal when it is asked for in the vacancy increases the probability
of receiving a callback: the coefficients of socioemotional skills treatment and its interaction
with whether the signaled socioemotional skill is required in the vacancy is jointly significant
at 10 percent level. Finally, Model 6 shows that, while the effect sizes may change according to
cluster, results are qualitatively similar across all clusters.
Result 2. Signaling a socioemotional skill decreases the probability of being invited for an interview if
the skill is not specifically asked for in the vacancy, and it increases the probability of being invited for
an interview if asked in the vacancy text.
We finally investigate whether the probabilities of callback for out treatment CVs are differ-
ent according to the applicant’s gender.13 Table 1.13 provides the results from OLS regressions
conditional on the applicant’s CV clicked, and with cluster-robust standard errors at the va-
cancy level. Results show that female candidates with socioemotional skill signals in their CVs
are around 5% less likely to be invited for an interview when the vacancy text does not specif-
ically ask for the socioemotional skill signaled. A joint significance test of the coefficient of
SE skills with its interaction with Male shows that this particular negative effect only holds for
women.14
Result 3. Firms that do not ask for the signaled socioemotional skills in the vacancy text evaluate the
skill signals negatively only for female applicants.
13Balance tables for each gender is provided in Appendix 1.D.
14Note that the results from the reverse audit (see Appendix 1.B for details) show that women are not less likely to
signal socioemotional skills in their CVs, indicating that this gender differerence cannot be attributed to our female
candidates being outliers in signaling their socioemotional skills.
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Table
1.13:T
he
effectofsocioem
otionalskills,conditionalon
applicantC
V
clicked
M
odel1
M
odel2
M
odel3
M
odel4
SE
skills
-0.050**
-0.049**
-0.048**
-0.048**
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.023)
Signaled
SE
skillrequired
in
vacancy
-0.004
-0.005
-0.007
-0.007
(0.028)
(0.028)
(0.028)
(0.028)
SE
skills
*
Signaled
SE
skillrequired
in
vacancy
0.071**
0.070**
0.069**
0.069**
(0.029)
(0.029)
(0.028)
(0.029)
M
ale
-0.068***
-0.046
-0.064**
-0.043
(0.025)
(0.029)
(0.025)
(0.029)
SE
skills
*
M
ale
0.048
0.048
0.045
0.045
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
Signaled
SE
skillrequired
in
vacancy
*
M
ale
0.018
0.018
0.016
0.017
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.031)
SE
skills
*
Signaled
SE
skillrequired
in
vacancy
*
M
ale
-0.044
-0.044
-0.042
-0.042
(0.039)
(0.040)
(0.040)
(0.040)
C
onstant
0.201***
0.960**
0.195***
0.916**
(0.023)
(0.414)
(0.030)
(0.412)
Individualchar.
N
o
Yes
N
o
Yes
V
acancy
char.
N
o
N
o
Yes
Yes
N
.obs.
3469
3469
3469
3469
R
-squared
0.006
0.008
0.016
0.017
N
otes:
M
odels
1
to
4
report
the
results
from
O
LS
regressions.
C
luster-robust
standard
errors
at
the
vacancy
level
are
show
n
in
parentheses.
D
ependent
variable
in
all
regressions
is
a
dum
m
y
that
takes
on
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value
1
if
the
applicant
is
invited
for
an
interview
.
V
ariable
SE
skills
takes
on
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value
1
for
treatm
entC
V
s,0
otherw
ise.
V
ariable
V
acancy
and
C
V
sectors
m
atch
takes
on
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value
1
if
the
vacancy
is
in
the
sam
e
sector
w
ith
applicant’s
current
or
previous
sectors.
Individualcharacteristics
include
experience
in
m
onths,age
in
years,w
hether
the
candidate
w
orked
in
one
job
only,and
objective
and
subjective
beauty
score
m
easures.
V
acancy
characteristics
include
total
num
ber
of
applications
for
the
vacancy,
occupational
clusters
and
location.
Sym
bols∗∗∗,∗∗,and∗
indicate
significance
atthe
1%
,5%
and
10%
level,respectively.
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1.4 Conclusion
Economics literature has clearly demonstrated that socioemotional skills are important in
determining earnings, but it is not obvious whether socioemotional skills matter in the hiring
stage. Focusing on the hiring stage, this study answers whether and how these skills should be
signaled for male and female candidates. Our results suggest that signaling a socioemotional
skill increases the probability of receiving a callback only if the skill is specifically asked for in
the vacancy text. There is also a penalty for female applicants: If they signal a skill not asked
for, the probability of receiving a callback decreases for them.
Our unique dataset allows us to open the black box of candidate screening, and we inves-
tigate the importance of gender in all three stages of employer screening: making the long list,
clicking on a candidate’s CV, and inviting a candidate for an interview. We find that employers
indicate a preference for women when making the long list, and that gender discrimination
does not exist conditional on candidates making it to the long list. Interestingly, this result
suggests that candidate’s beauty does not play a role in gender preference of employers, since
employers are simply not able to filter using beauty and the photos of applicants are not visible
at this stage.15
Our results imply that for socioemotional skill signals to help in securing job interviews,
one must be careful on when to include them in the CVs. A CV tailored only to the candi-
date’s qualifications, at least in terms of socioemotional skill signals, may backfire in the job
hunt even though the candidate may in fact have quite strong socioemotional skills. This is
especially true for female applicants, which may be due to employer preferences. Previous
literature suggests that women and men have different traits on risk-aversity, competition, ne-
gotiation, and tendency to overestimate themselves (Babcock and Laschever, 2009; Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Ludwig et al., 2017).
Women are also less likely to be overconfident compared to men (Lundeberg et al., 1994; Bar-
ber and Odean, 2001). Employers may then expect female candidates to be less overconfident
compared to the male candidates with similar characteristics. Arguably, a candidate that in-
cludes a socioemotional skill signal not specifically asked for in the vacancy may be evaluated
as overconfident by the employer. If the candidate is female, employers may evaluate the sig-
nals negatively because they evaluate her overconfidence negatively, whereas male candidates
are expected to show overconfidence in their CVs during application.
15Hamermesh and Biddle (1994); Barry (2000); Mobius and Rosenblat (2006); Scholz and Sicinski (2015); Doorley
and Sierminska (2015) find beauty affects earnings, Deryugina and Shurchkov (2015) find that it does so only when
beauty is expected to matter for performance, Lo´pez Bo´o et al. (2013) find that attractiveness increases invitations
for interview.
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While our results provide a detailed assessment of whether and how socioemotional skill
signals may be useful (or detrimental) in the hiring stage, we can observe what happens only
before the interview stage. It is plausible that employers test socioemotional skills of applicants
during the interview through specific tests or questions. In this sense, it may be the case that
socioemotional skill signals are valuable conditional on making it to the interview stage, or in
other words, what we find as a positive effect for vacancies that ask for socioemotional skills
we signal is a minimum effect. It may also be the case that employers value all socioemotional
skill signals, but again, conditional on making it to the interview. These two aspects can unfor-
tunately not be investigated using our design and methodology.
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1.A Objective and subjective beauty scores
Photos are commonly used in the online job portals in Turkey. In order to reflect this aspect
in our applications, we needed to use photos for the CVs of our fictitious candidates. Below is
the procedure we generated the photos and how we made sure that male and female photos
reflect similar beauty levels on average.
The photos used in the experiment are generated using volunteer face shots of Italian and
Turkish males and females aged 22 to 30. All collected face shots were taken either by a pho-
tographer or the volunteers themselves, and each volunteer signed an informed consent form
before sharing his/her photos with us.
The photos collected in this manner were handed over to a graphic designer, who created
sets of new photos. None of the photos were exactly the same with the real versions, but pieces
of several photos were used to create fictitious photos using Photoshop.
The photos obtained were then grouped according to their gender, and then two different
measures of beauty and attractiveness were collected for each of the photos. The following
parts explain the definition and measurement of the two different beauty scores, and the pro-
cedure used to eliminate potential biases resulting from differences in attractiveness.
Objective beauty scores
The first measure is the attractiveness score based on the face shape, distance between the
eyes and lips, mouth size and face symmetry, using the golden ratio where appropriate. This
type of measurement, which we call the objective beauty score, is from a scale of 0 to 100. The
software at www.prettyscale.com was used for this part.
After the scores were collected, photos that had a rating that is too high (above 0.89) or too
low (less than 0.45) were removed from the set, resulting in the removal of 7 photos. Then, the
sets of male and female photos were compared in terms of the mean and the distribution. In
order to make the minimum and maximum values similar for males and females, we deleted
the male photos that had an objective beauty score above 0.82, and female photos that had an
objective beauty score below 0.58, resulting in the deletion of 25 photos in total.
The objective beauty score depends solely on the placement of facial features without any
reference to details such as hair color, color of the eyes and other features that may affect how
beautiful the person in the photo is perceived. Moreover, whereas the objective beauty scores
do not change according to country, individuals from different countries are known to have
different conceptions of beauty.16 This is why we also collected data on a second measure that
16For an example please see the Perceptions of Perfection Across Borders Project conducted by the UK pharmacy
Superdrug: https://onlinedoctor.superdrug.com/perceptions-of-perfection/tab
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we call the subjective beauty score, provided in the next part.
Subjective beauty scores
The scores for subjective beauty are the average beauty scores obtained from the ratings col-
lected through an online survey. The online survey was conducted in Turkish and distributed
through the Twitter accounts of the World Bank Turkey Office and the Economic Policy Re-
search Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV).
The first page of the online survey included an informed consent form specifying informa-
tion about the project and the task, and other details including contact details. Approving the
informed consent, the participants then moved directly to rating the photos from a scale of 1 to
10, 10 being the highest beauty score. On each page, the software showed ten male and female
photos in random order. Participants could leave at any moment, but were informed that every
time they rate a total of 10 photos and click Next or End, their responses would be recorded. To
leave in the middle of the page before rating all 10 photos, the participant would simply close
the webpage.
The survey was conducted in April 2016 and 384 participants provided a total of 32,676
ratings. On average, a participant rated 85 photos.
Before running the analysis, we eliminated some of the observations:
• We dropped observations for all respondents under the age of 18, resulting in the deletion
of 17 respondents and a total of 1724 ratings.
• We dropped observations for all respondents that provided the same rating for all photos
they viewed, resulting in the deletion of 5 respondents and 91 observations.
Since our aim was to create a set of similar photos for males and females, we removed the
photos that had too high or too low average subjective ratings, removing a total of 33 photos
and 3130 observations that had an average subjective rating less than 3 or above 7.17
As a result of these stages, the regressions were run using observations from 361 respon-
dents for 237 photos, and a total of 24,392 observations.
The main specification we use throughout the analysis is the following:
ratingij = β0 + β1 f emalephotoi + β2respondentj + e1 (1.1)
To control for objective beauty effects that may account for some of the gender difference in
the subjective beauty scores, we also use the following specification where we control for the
objective beauty scores:
17About two standard deviations around the mean.
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ratingij = β0 + β1 f emalephotoi + β2respondentj + β3beautyscorei + e2 (1.2)
where ratingij denotes the subjective beauty rating for photo i from respondent j; f emalephotoi
is a dummy that takes the value 1 if photo i is of a female, and 0 otherwise; respondentj denotes
the respondent-specific characteristics, and beautyscorei denotes the objective beauty score of
photo i.
Both equations are estimated using OLS, and the results are shown in the first two columns
of Table 1. According to the estimations, both specifications show a significantly higher rating
for female photos in the sample. Given this result, we decide to select a subsample of the set
so that the distribution of average subjective beauty scores for each gender is similar, and use
that subsample in our experiment. In order to do that, we first need to find the influential
observations, and remove the photos that cause these influential observations.
The measure we use is DFBETA, which measures how much impact a particular observation
has in the regression coefficient of an explanatory variable. DFBETA computes the difference
in β2 for all observations when that particular observation is and is not included in the data,
therefore computing the influence of that particular observation on f emalephoto.
We generate the DFBETAs for each observation that contributes to the significance of f emalephoto,
using Model 1.2 above. We then get the average DFBETAs for each photo, and rank them in
terms of the magnitude of the influence, and delete the most influential photos from our sam-
ple until we obtain an insignificant coefficient for the variable f emalephoto in the estimation of
Model 1.2.
The final selection includes 99 female and 101 male photos. Models 1.1 and 1.2 run us-
ing the observations for this selected photos shows an insignificant coefficient for the variable
f emalephoto, as shown in the third and the fourth columns of Table 1.14.
Finally, we demonstrate that the unconditional means and the distributions of both the
objective and the subjective measures of beauty are statistically the same between the male and
female samples, using nonparametric tests. Table 1.15 outlines the results. The results show
the tests fail to reject that the female and male objective and subjective beauty measures have
the same means. Similarly, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the null that the
distributions of the male and the female subjective and objective beauty scores are the same.
Figure 1.3 provides four examples of photos used in the experiment, two each for two genders
with low and high subjective and objective beauty scores.
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Table 1.14: Regression results
All photos Photos selected for the experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
femalephoto 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.031 0.028
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
beautyscore 0.025 0.542***
(0.156) (0.168)
Constant 5.500*** 5.483*** 4.000*** 3.615***
(1.069) (1.074) 0 -0.12
Observations 24,392 24,392 20,573 20,573
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.377 0.377
Respondent-specific characteristics are included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.15: Tests for the unconditional means and distributions for the objective and subjective
beauty measures
Two-tailed t-test Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test statistic
Subjective beauty scores -0.3045 -0.527
(0.7611) (0.5985)
Objective beauty scores -0.3984 0.296
(0.6908) (0.7673)
p-values are given in parenthesis.
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Figure 1.3: Examples of male and female photos
(a) Female - lower score (b) Female - higher score
(c) Male - lower score (d) Male - higher score
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1.B Determining the socioemotional skill signals
Step 1: Literature survey
Six occupational themes (i.e. RIASEC themes; Holland, 1959, 1997) form the basis of all oc-
cupational classifications. The RIASEC acronym stands for Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, So-
cial, Enterprising, and Conventional occupations. This model specifies what common activities
underlie each occupational theme and outlines corresponding personalities and interests that
would fit each theme. Using the RIASEC themes vocational counselors and Human Resource
specialists have been matching individuals to certain occupations or positions on grounds of
person-occupation fit.
We first identified 52 occupational groups and 15 industries that can be described using
these six themes. Based on the dominant activities and job requirements, each occupation can
be summarized with a two-theme of three-theme code. For example, engineering occupations
involve dealing with tools and machines and also researching and identifying the most opti-
mum design, thus they typically have a Realistic-Investigative (RI) code. Codes reveal what
interest and personality characteristics (including socioemotional skills) are most important to
be successful and satisfied in that occupation. Hence, the occupational groups identified by the
project team are first categorized into the RIASEC themes. This was accomplished using the
Occupational Information Network (O*NET; www.onetonline.org); an online database compil-
ing years of research and accumulated knowledge on work characteristics and related abilities,
personality, and vocational interests based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US De-
partment of Labor, 1991) and the Dictionary of Holland Occupational Codes (Gottfredson &
Holland, 1996). Occupations were then matched with the corresponding personality character-
istics from the O*NET and also from norm studies of the 16 Personality Factor model (Conn &
Rieke, 1994).
Step 2: The reverse audit study
In this step, we collaborated with a private company in Kocaeli, Turkey, which is outside,
but extremely close, to the largest labor market we study in our experiment (Istanbul). The
company was in the process of starting to collect applications for two positions, a Customer Re-
lations Manager (CRM) and a Human Resources Specialist (HR). We added the socio-emotional
skill descriptors we obtained from Step 1 above, and asked to collect anonymized CV informa-
tion from the company, as well as which one of the CVs they invited for an interview in the end.
CVs of applicants were analyzed and coded in terms of the socioemotional skills mentioned.
Specifically, which socioemotional skill construct was signaled (e.g. leadership), how it was sig-
naled, the type of signal used (adjective, activity or ambiguous), and the section of the CV it
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was signaled (e.g. abilities) was coded. In coding the type of signal, signals were categorized
as “adjective” if the applicant explicitly used adjectives to describe self. Signals were coded
as “activity” as long as the applicant provided an experience or an activity that demonstrates
the utilization of the signaled skills. The “ambiguous” category was used to refer to completed
seminars or certificates related to developing a specific socioemotional skill. In such cases the
applicant is not claiming to have developed the skill (unless indicated elsewhere) and there is
no experiential indication of such.
The analyses of coded data included how many of the socioemotional skill signals were
mentioned broken down by the open position, signal type, CV section, and gender. Counts
were obtained based on the number of data points including multiple entries by one person,
and also based on the number of CVs. Here, results based on the number of CVs are summa-
rized.
CRM Position Applicants
The CRM position ad was soliciting for applicants with the socioemotional skills of strong
communication, teamwork orientation, open to continuous self-development and novel ap-
proaches, adaptability to dynamic work contexts, strong persuasion skills, and leadership skills
(even though the ad only specified leadership skills, managerial skills were also coded as rel-
evant for the job). Of the 184 applicants, 91 (49.5%) did signal at least one socioemotional
skill with 44 men and 47 women. 93 did not include any socioemotional skill signal with 45
men and 48 women. 69 out of 91 (76%) applicants mentioned an ambiguous signal (45% men
and 55% women), 25 out of 91 (27.5%) mentioned an adjective (40% men and 60% women),
and 20 out of 91 (22%) mentioned an activity (55% men and 45% women). Out of the 69 who
mentioned an ambiguous socioemotional skill signal (certificates and seminars), 54 applicants
(78%) mentioned a solicited socioemotional skill, with 44% men and 56% women. Out of the
25 applicants who mentioned an adjective type signal, 10 applicants (40%) included a solicited
socioemotional skill, with all of them women. Out of the 20 applicants with an activity signal,
all mentioned the solicited socioemotional skill signals, with 55% men and 45% women. Al-
together 84 applicants signaled a solicited socioemotional signal (92.3% of those who signaled
any socioemotional skill and 45.57 of total applicants). Of those who mentioned solicited so-
cioemotional skills, 49 (58%) were women and 35 were men (42%). Activity-type signals were
mostly indicative of leadership/managerial signals. Adjective-type signals were mostly indica-
tive of being open to self-development and teamwork orientation. Information on certificates
and seminars (i.e. ambiguous-type signals) were mostly about communication and leadership.
Of those who mentioned solicited socioemotional skills, only 9 mentioned both an adjective
and an activity.
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HR Specialist Position Applicants
The HR position ad was soliciting for applicants with the socioemotional skills of commu-
nication, teamwork, openness to continuous self-development, planning/organization, follow-
ing through (goal-orientation), detail-oriented, sense of responsibility, and adaptability. A total
of 535 applicants CV information was analyzed. These included the first 200 applicants (one of
which received an interview call), 10 applicants who received an interview call, 225 applicants
with English speaking, writing, and listening skill scores of 5 and 6, and 100 applicants selected
randomly from the list of applicants with an English score of 4. Of the 535 applicants, 248 (46%)
did signal at least one socioemotional skill with 76 men and 172 women. 286 did not include
any socioemotional signal with 110 men and 176 women. 159 out of 248 (64%) applicants men-
tioned an ambiguous signal (26% men and 74% women), 88 out of 245 (35%) mentioned an
adjective (40% men and 60% women), and 51 out of 248 (21%) mentioned an activity (20% men
and 80% women).
Out of the 159 who mentioned an ambiguous socioemotional signal (certificates and semi-
nars), 63 applicants (40%) mentioned a solicited socioemotional skill, with 21% men and 79%
women. Out of the 88 applicants who mentioned an adjective type signal, 79 applicants (90%)
included a solicited socioemotional skill, with 40% men and 60% women. Out of the 51 ap-
plicants with an activity signal, 25 applicants (49%) mentioned the solicited socioemotional
skill signals, with 16% men and 84% women. Altogether 167 applicants (29.3% men and 70.7%
women) signaled a solicited socioemotional skill signal (67.3% of those who signaled any so-
cioemotional skill and 31.2% of total applicants).
Activity-type signals were mostly indicative of leadership/managerial signals (not solicited
in the ad), organization skills, teamwork and adaptability. The solicited socioemotional skills
were the mostly appearing adjectives. Information on certificates and seminars (i.e. ambiguous-
type signals) were mostly about communication and leadership (not a solicited skill for HR).
Of those who mentioned solicited socioemotional skills, only 9 mentioned both an adjective
and an activity.
Analyses by gender
CVs of 89 men and 95 women applicants were analyzed for the CRM position and 188
men and 347 women applicants were analyzed for the HR position. Table 1.16 displays the
percentage of men and women in terms of providing the solicited signals.
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Table 1.16: Socioemotional signals by candidates
Ambiguous Adjective Activity Any
Customer Relations
Women (N = 95) 31.6% 10.5% 9.5% 51.6%
Men (N = 89) 27% 0% 12.4% 39.3%
Total (N = 184) 29.3% 5.4% 10.9% 45.7%
Human Resources
Women (N = 347) 14.4% 13.5% 6.1% 34%
Men (N = 188) 6.9% 17% 2.1% 26.1%
Total (N = 535) 11.8% 14.8% 4.7% 31.2%
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1.D Conditional balance tables
Table 1.18: Balance table for gender treatment, conditional on applicant being in the long list
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Males Females Difference
Ankara 0.185 0.183 -0.002
(0.388) (0.387) (0.009)
Istanbul Asia 0.309 0.308 -0.001
(0.462) (0.462) (0.011)
Istanbul EU 0.506 0.509 0.003
(0.500) (0.500) (0.011)
Experience (months) 49.041 49.498 0.457
(5.588) (5.664) (0.129)***
Age 26.786 26.053 -0.733
(0.561) (0.506) (0.012)***
Accounting 0.259 0.261 0.002
(0.438) (0.439) (0.010)
Marketing 0.286 0.286 -0.000
(0.452) (0.452) (0.010)
Sales 0.315 0.313 -0.001
(0.464) (0.464) (0.011)
IT 0.140 0.140 0.000
(0.347) (0.347) (0.008)
Worked in one firm only 0.278 0.247 -0.031
(0.448) (0.431) (0.010)***
Objective beauty 0.928 0.965 0.037
(0.259) (0.185) (0.005)***
Subjective beauty 0.451 0.550 0.099
(0.498) (0.498) (0.011)***
Reading 4.575 4.562 -0.013
(0.494) (0.496) (0.011)
Speaking 4.519 4.525 0.006
(0.500) (0.499) (0.011)
Writing 4.522 4.499 -0.023
(0.500) (0.500) (0.011)**
Besiktas 0.452 0.456 0.003
(0.498) (0.498) (0.011)
Kadikoy 0.309 0.308 -0.001
(0.462) (0.462) (0.011)
Kagithane 0.054 0.054 -0.000
(0.226) (0.225) (0.005)
Cankaya 0.185 0.183 -0.002
(0.388) (0.387) (0.009)
Observations 3,845 3,809 7,654
Notes: Standard errors are given in parantheses. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.19: Balance table for gender treatment, conditional on applicant’s CV clicked
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Males Females Difference
Ankara 0.200 0.197 -0.003
(0.400) (0.398) (0.014)
Istanbul Asia 0.316 0.308 -0.008
(0.465) (0.462) (0.016)
Istanbul EU 0.484 0.495 0.011
(0.500) (0.500) (0.017)
Experience (months) 48.816 49.577 0.761
(5.575) (5.585) (0.190)***
Age 26.756 26.052 -0.704
(0.568) (0.502) (0.018)***
Accounting 0.209 0.204 -0.005
(0.407) (0.403) (0.014)
Marketing 0.239 0.243 0.004
(0.427) (0.429) (0.015)
Sales 0.317 0.350 0.033
(0.465) (0.477) (0.016)**
IT 0.235 0.203 -0.032
(0.424) (0.402) (0.014)**
Worked in one firm only 0.275 0.269 -0.006
(0.447) (0.444) (0.015)
Objective beauty 0.938 0.961 0.024
(0.242) (0.193) (0.007)***
Subjective beauty 0.462 0.538 0.076
(0.499) (0.499) (0.017)***
Reading 4.550 4.559 0.010
(0.498) (0.497) (0.017)
Speaking 4.505 4.530 0.025
(0.500) (0.499) (0.017)
Writing 4.520 4.500 -0.020
(0.500) (0.500) (0.017)
Besiktas 0.389 0.415 0.025
(0.488) (0.493) (0.017)
Kadikoy 0.316 0.308 -0.008
(0.465) (0.462) (0.016)
Kagithane 0.095 0.081 -0.014
(0.293) (0.272) (0.010)
Cankaya 0.200 0.197 -0.003
(0.400) (0.398) (0.014)
Observations 1,656 1,813 3,469
Notes: Standard errors are given in parantheses. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.20: Balance table for socioemotional skills treatment, conditional on applicant being in
the long list
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treatment Difference
Ankara 0.185 0.183 -0.002
(0.388) (0.386) (0.009)
Istanbul Asia 0.309 0.308 -0.001
(0.462) (0.462) (0.011)
Istanbul EU 0.506 0.510 0.004
(0.500) (0.500) (0.011)
Experience (months) 49.296 49.240 -0.056
(5.548) (5.711) (0.129)
Age 26.422 26.420 -0.002
(0.642) (0.654) (0.015)
Accounting 0.259 0.261 0.002
(0.438) (0.439) (0.010)
Marketing 0.287 0.285 -0.002
(0.452) (0.452) (0.010)
Sales 0.314 0.314 -0.001
(0.464) (0.464) (0.011)
IT 0.140 0.140 0.000
(0.347) (0.347) (0.008)
Worked in one firm only 0.255 0.270 0.015
(0.436) (0.444) (0.010)
Objective beauty 0.944 0.948 0.004
(0.230) (0.222) (0.005)
Subjective beauty 0.508 0.493 -0.015
(0.500) (0.500) (0.011)
Reading 4.576 4.561 -0.015
(0.494) (0.496) (0.011)
Speaking 4.510 4.534 0.025
(0.500) (0.499) (0.011)**
Writing 4.515 4.506 -0.008
(0.500) (0.500) (0.011)
Besiktas 0.452 0.456 0.004
(0.498) (0.498) (0.011)
Kadikoy 0.309 0.308 -0.001
(0.462) (0.462) (0.011)
Kagithane 0.054 0.054 -0.000
(0.226) (0.225) (0.005)
Cankaya 0.185 0.183 -0.002
(0.388) (0.386) (0.009)
Observations 3,831 3,823 7,654
Notes: Standard errors are given in parantheses. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.21: Balance table for socioemotional skills treatment, conditional on applicant’s CV
clicked
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treatment Difference
Ankara 0.194 0.203 0.009
(0.395) (0.402) (0.014)
Istanbul Asia 0.315 0.309 -0.006
(0.464) (0.462) (0.016)
Istanbul EU 0.492 0.488 -0.003
(0.500) (0.500) (0.017)
Experience (months) 49.322 49.101 -0.220
(5.512) (5.674) (0.190)
Age 26.388 26.388 -0.001
(0.632) (0.648) (0.022)
Accounting 0.202 0.211 0.008
(0.402) (0.408) (0.014)
Marketing 0.244 0.238 -0.005
(0.429) (0.426) (0.015)
Sales 0.336 0.333 -0.003
(0.472) (0.471) (0.016)
IT 0.218 0.218 0.000
(0.413) (0.413) (0.014)
Worked in one firm only 0.267 0.278 0.011
(0.442) (0.448) (0.015)
Objective beauty 0.949 0.952 0.003
(0.221) (0.215) (0.007)
Subjective beauty 0.516 0.487 -0.030
(0.500) (0.500) (0.017)*
Reading 4.549 4.560 0.011
(0.498) (0.496) (0.017)
Speaking 4.505 4.531 0.026
(0.500) (0.499) (0.017)
Writing 4.510 4.509 -0.000
(0.500) (0.500) (0.017)
Besiktas 0.403 0.402 -0.001
(0.491) (0.491) (0.017)
Kadikoy 0.315 0.309 -0.006
(0.464) (0.462) (0.016)
Kagithane 0.089 0.086 -0.002
(0.284) (0.281) (0.010)
Cankaya 0.194 0.203 0.009
(0.395) (0.402) (0.014)
Observations 1,774 1,695 3,469
Notes: Standard errors are given in parantheses. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Chapter 2
Signaling Socioemotional Skills
This chapter consists of a prior study for a larger research project with coauthors Stefan Hut, Vic-
toria Levin and Ana Maria Munoz Boudet and includes only the work I conducted.1
Many sources from career support centers to online job application portals suggest that the candidate
should signal different types of skills, such as hard skills, socioemotional skills, and technical skills, in
their CV as they are valuable for companies in their assessment of the candidates. However, signalling
socioemotional skills may not be trivial. Using an online randomized discrete choice experiment, this study
aims to find how to signal socioemotional skills effectively. Randomly assigned socioemotional skill signals
are shown to potential future human resources personnel, and information on how well they remember
each CV characteristic as well as which candidate they would potentially invite for an interview are col-
lected.The results suggest that socioemotional skills are at least as well remembered as other skills, such as
cognitive skills, on the CV, implying the importance attributed to them. This is especially true when the
skills are listed as activity-based signals. Supporting this finding, socioemotional skills signaled through
costly activities are considered valuable when inviting candidates for an interview, while adjectives as so-
cioemotional skills do not make a significant difference than a CV without any socioemotional skill signal.
JEL classification: C99, J24
Keywords: socioemotional skills, labor market signaling, online experiment
1I would like to thank Francesca Barigozzi, Maria Bigoni, Giacomo Calzolari, Margherita Fort, Davide Raggi,
Giulio Zanella, Bengisu Ozenc, Victoria Levin, Ana Maria Munoz Boudet, Stefan Hut, and participants at the Uni-
versity of Bologna and WESSI at NYUAD presentations for helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions
of this paper. I would also like to thank Matt Notowidigdo for providing the software used in their paper and Yonca
Toker for her guidance on the psychology literature on socioemotional skills. The usual disclaimer applies.
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2.1 Introduction
Many sources from career support centers to online job application portals’ sources on how
to write a good CV suggest the potential candidate to signal different types of skills, such
as hard skills, socioemotional skills, and technical skills, in their CV as they are valuable for
companies in their assessment of the candidates. In fact, it is quite common to see specific
socioemotional skills requirements listed in the vacancy ad texts, for example, in the form of
leadership or communication skills, depending on the characteristics of the occupation.
Economics literature has also firmly established that socioemotional skills are a form of
human capital and the posession of socioemotional skills has a positive impact on lifetime
earnings (see for example, Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al., 2006; Bowles et al.,
2001a). However, while earnings over the lifetime seem to be positively affected by socioemo-
tional skills, whether these skills are a significant factor in employers’ hiring decisions has not
been analysed in economics until very recently. It is important to distinguish between the value
of socioemotional skills for lifetime earnings and at the stage of hiring, because if employers
in fact do not consider socioemotional skills important in their hiring decisions, then it is not
optimal for job seekers to signal them at all in their CVs, or invest time and money on develop-
ing these skills through experience if the sole purpose is to signal them in their job applications.
In a recent working paper, Piopiunik et al. (2018) implement an online survey to a repre-
sentative sample of German human resources managers and show that socioemotional skills
are considered to be important by employers, providing the first evidence that socioemotional
skills matter at the hiring stage. However, the problem of signaling is not solved even when
socioemotional skills are known to be valuable for employers for hiring decisions: The candi-
date must still know how best to signal these skills when applying for a job. While education
and labor economics as well as the literature on signaling have established that the candidate
should signal her cognitive skills through her education, it is far from clear what advice to give
to the candidate in terms of signaling socioemotional skills. To see what options are available,
consider a young professional with a few years of job experience. Upon the finding that socioe-
motional skills are valuable at the hiring stage, the candidate may decide to include a signal in
her CV that shows she has, say, strong negotiation skills. Searching for some example signals
online, she would realize that there are different possible ways to include these skill signals
in the CV. The first alternative is to list her socioemotional skills as an adjective in the section
where she lists her other skills, such as her technical skills. She can do that by adding a text
in the form of, e.g., “strong negotiation skills”. Signals of this type do include the skill, but
they may not be credible since the candidate has not incurred any costs - time or money - to
be able to signal these skills. Another alternative then is to include them through presumably
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some costly activities, such as tasks at work or extracurricular activities during education, e.g.,
by adding “participated in debate tournaments as an undergraduate student”, where she has
devoted time and possibly some money while doing these tasks. I consider the first type an
adjective-based socioemotional skill signal following the fact that it is just the statement of an
adjective by oneself about herself, and the second type as an activity-based skill signal since it
attempts to demonstrate the possession of the skill through some sort of (costly) activity.
This paper is concerned with whether potential employers consider socioemotional skills
important in evaluating candidates, and what kind of signals receive a higher evaluation. In
particular, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the following questions:
1. During the job recruitment process, are socioemotional skills valued above and beyond
other factors, such as education and experience?
2. During the job recruitment process, are either one of activity-based social skill signals or
adjective-based social skill signals valued higher compared to the other?
An important drawback that limits the studies on socioemotional skills is their measure-
ment. It is not possible to directly observe or measure socioemotional skills. The conventional
method is to use performance in tests such as the Big-5 Personality Test, but performance in
any test depends on effort, socioemotional skills, cognitive ability, and incentives, causing bi-
ased estimations of the effect of any particular variable such as socioemotional skills (Heckman
and Kautz, 2012). For example, studies show that incentives in the form of rewards affect per-
formance in IQ tests, and this effect varies with the level of socioemotional skills (Borghans
et al., 2008; Segal, 2012). Moreover, as argued by (Heckman and Kautz, 2012, p.455), it is not
clear whether the measured traits “are the manifestation of a deeper set of preferences or goals.
Achieving certain goals requires certain traits, e.g., a surgeon has to be careful and intelligent;
a salesman has to be outgoing and engaging and so forth,etc. Under this view, traits are devel-
oped through practice, investment, and habituation.” It follows from this argument that at least
some aspects of socioemotional skills that are valuable for the individual’s job might change
with work experience, causing an endogeneity problem in the identification of socioemotional
skill effects in the labor market.
The literature is not clear even on which name to use. In their review, (Heckman and Kautz,
2012, p.452) state that the terms “soft skills”, “personality traits”, “non-cognitive skills”, “non-
cognitive abilities”, “character”, and “socioemotional skills” are all used to identify the per-
sonality attributes. The key difference between skills and traits are that skills indicate prop-
erties that can be learned, whereas traits imply permanence. The authors argue both skills
and traits can change over time and across the life cycle, but the mechanisms through which
they change may be different. Heckman (2008) identifies socioemotional skills as motivation,
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socioemotional regulation, time preference, personality factors and the ability to work with
others; although in practice the use of certain socioemotional skills in research in labor eco-
nomics depends heavily on data availability (Brunello and Schlotter, 2011). This unavailability
of data on different dimensions of socioemotional skills makes it difficult to establish the true
extent of the importance of these skills, because the relative importance of different socioemo-
tional skills are different depending on occupation. For example, a sales assistant practices
tasks that require extraversion, persuasion and negotiation skills, whereas detail-orientation
is valued to a higher degree for an accountant. These different necessities of socioemotional
skills are stated first through the O*NET classifications that are widely used in labor market
research. O*NET categorizes occupations using one or more of the categories ‘Realistic, Inves-
tigative, Artistics, Social, Enterprising, Conventional’, based on the daily tasks involved in the
occupation.2 According to this classification, important socioemotional skills for each category
is different (Conn and Rieke, 1994). In addition to these classifications, conventional job ads
also specifically state the required socioemotional skills along with the tasks expected from the
candidate.3
This study solves the problems of definition through gathering information from the O*NET
descriptions and the organizational psychology literature. Socioemotional skill used for each
occupation selected for the study are taken using these two sources. The problems of mea-
surement and identification are solved through the random assignment of socioemotional skill
signals. The methodology used in this study is a discrete choice experiment in which alter-
native CVs that include adjective-based, activity-based, or no socioemotional skill signals are
presented as pairs, and the subject selects which one to (hypothetically) invite for an interview.
After selection, CV characteristics are no longer visible, and the subject is asked to state various
CV characteristics for both CVs. The two variables of interest are the type of the CV selected
for an interview, and the rates of different CV characteristics that are correctly remembered.
The results suggest that socioemotional skills are at least as correctly recalled as the other
2Definitions for these categories are as follows. Realistic: Realistic occupations frequently involve work activities
that include practical, hands-on problems and solutions. They often deal with plants, animals, and real-world
materials like wood, tools, and machinery. Many of the occupations require working outside, and do not involve a
lot of paperwork or working closely with others. Investigative: Investigative occupations frequently involve working
with ideas, and require an extensive amount of thinking. These occupations can involve searching for facts and
figuring out problems mentally. Artistic: Artistic occupations frequently involve working with forms, designs and
patterns. They often require self-expression and the work can be done without following a clear set of rules. Social:
Social occupations frequently involve working with, communicating with, and teaching people. These occupations
often involve helping or providing service to others. Enterprising: Enterprising occupations frequently involve
starting up and carrying out projects. These occupations can involve leading people and making many decisions.
Sometimes they require risk taking and often deal with business. Conventional: Conventional occupations frequently
involve following set procedures and routines. These occupations can include working with data and details more
than with ideas. Usually there is a clear line of authority to follow.
3Job ads used in this experiment are given in Appendix 2.A.
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skills listed in the CVs, but activity-based signals are remembered better than the adjective-
based ones, suggesting a higher degree of importance assigned to the former compared to the
latter. This finding is further reinforced by the fact that CVs with activity-based socioemotional
skill signals are chosen more frequently compared to both CVs with adjective-based signals and
CVs with no socioemotional skill signals, and regression analyses show a significant effect of
activity-based signals on the selection of the CV for an interview. In line with the insights from
the signaling literature, the findings suggest that signaling socioemotional skills only through
adjectives is not useful when looking for a job. Instead, job seekers should focus on gathering
experiences that will later ensure them to signal their socioemotional skills in a more credible
way.
The experiment is not incentivized and the selection for an interview is hypothetical, lead-
ing to a potential drawback that participants may have not paid attention to the experiment.
However, three elements of the study are relevant in providing the validity of the results. First,
the subject pool includes senior undergraduates and masters students of pscyhology and busi-
ness administration, selected in order to provide a subject pool closer to potential human re-
sources personnel. The subject pool is thus arguably more interested than the general student
sample in attempting to select the best candidate for the task given. Furthermore, subjects tend
to remember CV elements correctly with a very high percentage, implying that they did in fact
pay attention to the CVs in making their decision. Finally, the fact that there is a significant
difference between which types of CVs are invited for an interview shows that the selection on
average was not made at random.
The following section explains the context in which socioemotional skills signaling is rele-
vant and distinguishes between types of signals, Section 2.3 outlines the methodology and the
design, Section 2.4 presents the results. The final section concludes.
2.2 Socioemotional skills and signaling: theoretical context
The theoretical intuition follows from the signaling model that is pioneered in Spence (1973).
Rather than building a formal model, this section explains the intuition behind the difference
between activity- and adjective-based socioemotional skill signals using the framework in So-
bel (2012).
Consider the case with a job seeker (S) and a potential employer (R), where the job seeker
is either a high- or a low-productivity candidate for the position the employer aims to fill. If
the job seeker has a high productivity, her type is θH, if low, then her type is θL, where θH > θL.
The type is observable to the job-seeker herself, but not to the employer, although the job seeker
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may signal her type through signaling her socioemotional skills to the potential employer.
In the beginning, the job seeker finds out about her type, θH or θL. She can then choose
whether to signal (s) an adjective-based (m) or an activity-based (c) signal, or nothing, where
c > m. An adjective-based signal (m) may be considered as cheap talk since it is not costly.
On the other hand, an activity-based signal (c) provides verifiable information about a previ-
ous activity that demonstrates the socioemotional skill, and is therefore costly. The employer
receives the signal and the employer decides on the action a. The action is either to invite the
job seeker for an interview, or do nothing.
The payoff to player i in this setting is given by the payoff function ui, where uS is strictly in-
creasing in a and strictly decreasing in the signal. uS also satisfies the single-crossing condition
such that if uS(θL, s, a) 6 uS(θL, s′, a′) for s′ > s, then uS(θH, s, a) < uS(θH, s′, a′). Employer’s
utility function uR is independent of the signal and increasing in the type of worker, such that
the high type is more likely to be employed. These assumptions imply that the high type is
able to send a higher signal, and that in equilibrium high type will send a weakly higher sig-
nal. Also, high type induces a higher action by the employer.
Given this structure, it is trivial to see that there is a separating equilibrium in which only
the high type sends a costly (activity-based) signal, and that the signal is valuable for the em-
ployer. On the other hand, the costless signal does not carry a meaningful message since the
job seeker’s utility is monotonic in the employer’s action, and so all job seekers would like to
send the highest possible signal. This implies that, upon receiving the signal m, employers can
identify the low type.
2.3 Experimental design
The design of the experiment follows the design used in the salience test in Kroft et al.
(2013), with some revisions to fit the current study.
Job and skills selection and creation of job ads
We select two occupations with different socioemotional skill necessities: financial analysts
and sales supervisors. We select an occupation-specific sociemotional skill based on the skills
listed in the O*NET description for the sales supervisor job. For the financial analyst position,
we select a socioemotional skill that is relevant for all occupations, namely teamwork. We base
this decision on the personnel selection in organizational psychology literature (Campbell et al.,
1993) and due to the fact that many financial analyst position job ads in practice especially ask
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for teamwork skills.4
The CVs were presented in the Europass format that is widely used in Europe, and the so-
cioemotional skill signal treatments were included in the section “Job-related skills” as shown
in Table 2.1. The exact job ad texts that we have provided to the subjects are given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Socioemotional skill signals for adjective- and activity-based treatments according to
occupation
Sales assistant Financial analyst
Adjective-based SE Persuasion skills, as-
sertiveness, strong inter-
personal/communication
skills.
Adaptability to new and mul-
ticultural contexts, familiar-
ity with teamwork
Activity-based SE Participation in 8 debate tour-
naments held locally and at
the national level 2008-2011;
Organizing the invitation of
two CEOs from the Aegean
region as key speakers at
the Debate Council meeting
(2012)
Member of Rotaract 2440 In-
ternational Commitee (2010-
), participated in the Interna-
tional Youth Camp, Arthez,
France and worked in 10-
member multicultural teams
(2012)
CV types and treatments
For each job type (sales supervisor or financial analyst), there are three types of CVs:
1. No socioemotional skill: This type of CV does not have any socioemotional skills listed in
the CV.
2. Adjective-based socioemotional skill: This type of CV has socioemotional skills listed as an
adjective only, such as “Persuasion skills”.
3. Activity-based socioemotional skill: This type of CV has socioemotional skills listed as an
activity, such as “Participation in 8 debate tournaments held locally and at the national
level 2008-2011”.
Table 2.3 summarizes the distribution of CVs for each CV type. From a total of 180 CVs, 88
are for sales supervisor and 92 are for the financial analyst. 61 CVs each are control and activity,
and 58 are adjective-based CVs.
4Based on job search done on the largest online job portal in Turkey where the experiment is conducted.
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Table 2.2: Vacancy ad texts
Sales assistant ad Financial analyst ad
Description:
We are searching for a Senior Sales Assistant
for our world leader client in clinical laboratory
testing of blood, urine and other specimens. In
this job you are expected to:
• Formulate and administer a Territory
Plan (Aegean region) with appropriate
sales strategies;
• Find new customers and business oppor-
tunities in the specified market and prod-
uct range,
• Execute the sales process including
demonstrations, proposal presentation,
negotiation and closing,
• Present company products to customers
to position the product’s technological su-
periority and benefits over competitors,
• Perform and participate in customer
meetings to promote the product lines.
Requirements:
The ideal candidate will possess:
• University degree in related departments
(Business preferred)
• 2 years of sales experience
• Computer Skills: MS Office (Word, Excel,
Powerpoint)
• Fluent level of English
• Strong interpersonal and communication
skills
• Strong negotiation skills, assertiveness
Description:
We are seeking a Financial Analyst for our
multinational client in the IT & Technology sec-
tor. In this job you are expected to:
• Check financial tables to ensure the
monthly financial reports prepared by the
accounting team are accurate,
• Analyze data and compare forecasts with
actual results,
• Prepare accurate, relevant and timely
management reports to accurately reflect
the status of the business,
• Identify trends and recommending ac-
tions to improve financial status.
Requirements: The ideal candidate will pos-
sess:
• University degree in Business Adminis-
tration, Economics or related area,
• At least 2 years working experience as ac-
counting & finance positions,
• Strong MS Office Applications, particu-
larly in Excel,
• International accounting knowledge
(IFRS) would be an asset,
• SAP knowledge is an asset,
• Fluent in spoken and written English
• Adaptability to a multinational environ-
ment,
• Teamworking skills
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Table 2.3: Distribution of jobs and CVs
Financial analyst Sales assistant Total
Control 33 28 61
Adjective 30 28 58
Activity 29 32 61
Total 92 88 180
Procedures
The discrete choice experiment was conducted between May and December 2015. Links for
the online survey were sent to 320 senior undergraduates and masters students of psychology
and business administration departments of two universities in Ankara and one university in
Izmir, Turkey; and 90 respondents replied. Psychology and business administration depart-
ments were chosen in order to reflect the educational background composition of the human
resources (HR) personnel in Turkey.5 The participants did not receive any compensation for
filling out the survey.
The experiment itself consisted of three steps:
Step 1. In the first step of the discrete choice experiment, respondents are asked to read a
job ad and CVs of two potential applicants for the advertised position. Both the text of the ad
and the individual profiles are composed to closely mirror the ads and CVs found on the most
popular job search engine in Turkey, and LinkedIn. The content of the CVs are representative
of an average CV for two fictitious individuals of similar characteristics: Candidates are both
female, and are the same age. Names are constructed using the list of most common names
and surnames in Turkey. Education history, and other information are constructed by using
the information from actual CVs available online. CVs constructed in this way (two for each
job) are later assigned the treatments, such that all CVs have Control, Adjective and Activity
versions, so that there are a total of two versions for each of control and treatment, and a total
of six CVs for each job. Participants are informed that they are asked to put themselves in the
hypothetical situation of a Human Resources Manager and are asked to select the best of the
two candidates for an in-person interview. In this stage, both the CVs and the job ad are visible
to the participant and the participant would be able compare the CVs side by side.
Step 2. Following their choice of the best candidate for the advertised position, the ad and
the CVs are removed from the screen, and the participants are not allowed to go back: If they
click on the back button of their browser, they receive a warning and we collect this informa-
tion as a separate variable.6 The participants are then asked a series of questions trying to recall
5Based on interviews with the HR departments
6They can return to the previous screen after they see the warning, but we mark them as ‘cheaters’ and control
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the CV characteristics including age, education, experience, and whether socioemiotional skills
were mentioned (either as a tagline or as hobbies/activities) and if so, what they were. They
are also asked to state the two most important attributes that led them to select the CV for the
in-person interview.
Step 3. Finally, the respondent is asked a few demographic questions, including gender,
age, level of experience reviewing CVs, work experience in HR.
The sequence of screens are given in Appendix 2.A. For each participant, the job ad is ran-
domly selected from two alternatives: ad for a sales supervisor or a financial analyst. The algo-
rithm then selects two random CVs for two females for the selected job ad. The randomization
is constructed such that same types of CVs never appear side by side, so that the participant al-
ways selects between two types and never among each type. Note that which side of the screen
each CV is shown is also randomized to avoid any selection effect based on reading habits.
2.4 Results
The main interest is to see whether socioemotional skills were an important dimension in
the selection of candidates for an interview. In order to see this, we first compare the frequency
with which the candidates correctly remember socioemotional skills with other types of skills
listed in the CV. When making this comparison, we only consider data from participants who
did not cheat (14 out of 90 cheated in total) in order to go back to the previous page where the
CVs were shown. We then investigate which candidates are more likely to be selected for an
interview, and whether socioemotional skills signals play a role in this decision.
Table 2.4 provides the number of subjects by treatment pairs and by job type. Out of a total
of 90, 46 were for the finance and 44 were for the sales job ad. Comparing the treatments, 29
subjects saw a control CV and a CV with an adjective-based signal side by side; 32 saw a con-
trol CV and a CV with an activity-based signal side by side; and another 29 saw a CV with an
adjective-based signal and a CV with an activity-based signal side by side.
Looking at how well the characteristics are correctly recalled for each applicant, i.e., the
salience of CV characteristics, the first observation to note is that socioemotional skills are re-
membered better than some of the CV characteristics, such as the job experience of the can-
didate. Table 2.5 shows the percentage of subjects who correctly remembered different CV
characteristics, computed as the average percentage of subjects that remembered each category
for this information.
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Table 2.4: Number of subjects by treatment couples and the frequency of types selected for
interview
All By Job
Finance Sales
Adj in Control-Adj 51.7% 41.2% 66.7%
Total Control-Adj 29 17 12
Act in Control-Act 71.9% 50.0% 93.8%
Total Control-Act 32 16 16
Act in Adj-Act 72.4% 92.3% 56.3%
Total Adj-Act 29 13 16
TOTAL 90 46 44
correctly by either selecting a characteristic that is signaled in CV, or not selecting one that is
not signaled in CV. Overall, quantitative/analytical skills are remembered correctly 96%, and
experience 47%. On the other hand, activity-based socioemotional skill signals are remembered
correctly 85% of the times, whereas adjective-based ones are remembered correctly in 75% of
the times. Out of the 13 different socioemotional skill signals listed, the median number of cor-
rectly remembered socioemotional skill is 11.
Subjects especially remember socioemotional skill signals when signaled through activi-
ties. Nonparametric tests provide a clearer picture, although more precise estimates using
regressions are provided in the following pages. To do this, we first create two variables that
capture the mean correct recall rates for socioemotional skills and other signals. All CVs have
a total of 13 socioemotional skill signals included in the questions, in the form of adjectives
or activities. Adjectives include adaptability to multicultural environments, attention to de-
tail, assertiveness, communication skills, motivation, persuasion skills and teamwork skills,
whereas activities include participation in international youth organization, participation in de-
bate tournaments, student club leadership, experience in organizing meetings, membership in
international organizations, and teamwork. For each subject, we create a variable that records
the mean recall rate for these skill signals, and another mean recall rate for the other signals in
the CV.7 We then run the nonparametric test based on these two variables that record the mean
recall rates for socioemotional skills signals and other signals in the CV. Based on a total of 76
observations for each subject that did not try to cheat by going back to the previous page, so-
cioemotional skills are correctly recalled 80% of the times on average, whereas the other skills
86%, and a paired t-test suggests that this difference is statistically significant (p-value=0.0031).
Comparing all cases where an activity-based CV was shown to subjects and the subject did not
cheat (57 observations), however, activity-based socioemotional skill signals are correctly re-
7All signals are provided in the screenshots provided in Appendix 2.A.
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called 85% of the times compared, not significantly different compared to correct recall rate for
other skills (86%).8 Furthermore, comparing the 27 cases where activity-based socioemotional
skills are shown together with an adjective-based CV, activity-based CVs are correctly recalled
with a frequency of 88% compared to 66% for the adjective-based ones, and this difference is
statistically significant.9
Result 1. Socioemotional skills are as correctly remembered as other skills in the CV, but this is true
only when they are signaled as activities.
Table 2.5: Percent correctly remembered for various CV characteristics (non-cheaters only)
All By Job
Finance Sales
Quantitative/analytical skills 96.1% 94.6% 97.4%
Language skills (French, Italian, English) 95.0% 93.2% 96.6%
What is the education level of the candidate? 92.8% 93.2% 92.3%
Is the candidate currently employed? 84.9% 83.8% 85.9%
Socioemotional skills (activity-based) 84.5% 84.2% 84.8%
Computer skills (MS Office, Stata, SAP, IFRS) 79.4% 60.5% 97.4%
Socioemotional skills (adjective-based) 75.3% 84.4% 66.7%
Experience level of the candidate (year and months) 46.7% 50.0% 43.6%
Note: Statistics derived for the 76 subjects who did not cheat. Subject is assumed to have correctly
remembered any signal if they correctly selected a characteristic signaled in the CV, or correctly
not selected a characteristic not signaled in the CV. Percent correctly recalled for language skills,
computer skills and socioemotional skills are averages across various skills under one category.
For example, language skills include the average correct recall for aggregated data on French,
Italian and English language skills, and so on. Experience level of the candidate is assumed to be
correctly guessed if guessed within a 5-month interval.
The second variable of interest is observing which candidates are more likely to be selected
for an interview, and whether socioemotional skills signals play a role in this decision. The raw
tabulations given in Table 2.4 clearly show a preference towards candidates with activity-based
socioemotional skills over both the control group (72% selects the activity-based treatment CV
over the control CV) and the candidates with adjective-based socioemotional skills (73% selects
the adjective-based treatment CV over the control CV); but no such pattern is apparent for the
selection of adjective-based socioemotional skills over the control CV (52% selects the adjective-
based treatment CV over the control CV). To corroborate this finding, we conduct a regression
analysis. The main model we consider in this case is as follows:
yi = α0 + β1Adj1i + β2Act1i + γ1Adj2i + γ2Act2i+
δ1Financei + δ2Salesi + θXi + δ1 jobtypei + ei (2.1)
8N = 57, p-value=0.7573.
9N = 27, p=0.000.
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where yi is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if CV 1 (CV on the left) is selected;
Adj1i (Adj2i) is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if CV 1 (CV 2) has adjective-based
non-cognitive skills; Act1i (Act2i) is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if CV 1 (CV 2)
has activity-based non-cognitive skills; Finance1i and (Sales1i) is a dummy variable that takes
on the value 1 if CV1 is the first type of CV constructed for the financial analyst (sales super-
visor) job ad and captures CV characteristics other than our treatments within the financial
analyst (sales supervisor) job applications; jobtypei controls for the type of job (sales supervisor
or financial analyst); and Xi covers the individual characteristics of the subjects such as gender,
undergraduate degree, experience in HR etc. Note that, since the position of the CVs on the
screen is allocated randomly for each CV couple, the terms CV 1 and CV 2 do not denote any
specific characteristic other than the random position of the CVs on the screen.
Model 1 in Table 2.6 gives the results of the model in (2.1). Note that we expect high
collinearity in this model since by the design of the experiment participants do not see two
CVs of the same type. For example, if CV 1 has the adjective-based non-cognitive skills treat-
ment, CV 2 either has no non-cognitive skills in the CV or had the activity-based one. Therefore
if Adj1 = 1, then Act1 = 0 and Adj2 = 0 must hold. This is why we try the specification in
Model 2 to avoid this type of collinearity effects. Model 2 uses the differences of the treatments
for each treatment, so that ∆Act = Act1 − Act2 and ∆Adj = Adj1 − Adj2. Both specifications
clearly show a significant effect of the activity-based treatment and an insignificant effect of the
adjective-based treatment on CV selection.
Result 2. Activity-based socioemotional skill signals play a significant role in CV selection, whereas
adjective-based socioemotional signals do not have a significant effect.
A similar picture emerges also looking at the ranking of attributes the participants stated
for the selection that they made. This part of the analysis is based on a question in the survey
that asks each participant how they rank the characteristics they consider the most important
in selecting a CV for an interview. They could select up to 6 CV qualities, and had to type their
ranking by giving each characteristic a number from 1 (highest ranked) to 6 (lowest ranked).
We then compute an average score for each of the characteristic using these rankings, by re-
ordering them from 6 (highest ranked) to 1 (lowest ranked), and calculating the average scores
weighted by the number of subjects that gave the characteristic that particular score. Finally,
we recalculate the scores on a scale of 0 to 1, for easier interpretation. The results are given in
Table 2.7, and they show that socioemotional skill signals are ranked quite high as attributes
considered to be important in CV selection for an interview. In particular, communication skills
are ranked the second in the list right after job experience, and persuasion skills are ranked the
fourth and above, for example, foreign language skills and technical skills.
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Table 2.6: Marginal effects from the logit regression of CV1 and CV2 characteristics on selection
of CV1
Model 1 Model 2
CV1 is adjective-based 0.157
(0.113)
CV1 is activity-based 0.243*
(0.125)
CV2 is adjective-based 0.054
(0.125)
CV2 is activity-based -0.253**
(0.104)
Other finance CV characteristics 0.305*** 0.318***
(0.108) (0.111)
Other sales CV characteristics 0.441*** 0.422***
(0.104) (0.101)
∆Act 0.243***
(0.060)
∆Adj 0.058
(0.065)
Subject characteristics Yes Yes
Job type Yes Yes
N.obs. 90 90
Pseudo R-squared 0.307 0.296
Note: Models 1 and 2 provide the marginal effects from logit regressions in which
the dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if CV1 (CV dis-
played on the left) is selected. Note that the display order for the CV is random-
ized. ∆Act = Act1− Act2 and ∆Adj = Adj1− Adj2. Other finance CV character-
istics and other sales characteristics each are dummy variables to denote the type
of finance or sales CV (there are two types of CVs for each job). Job type includes
a dummy variable for type of job (finance or sales), and subject characteristics
include type of undergraduate degree, gender, age, experience in HR. Symbols
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Ranking of attributes for CV selection (scale:0-1)
All By Job
Finance Sales
Job experience 0.71 0.72 0.71
Communication skills 0.68 0.61 0.72
Education level 0.68 0.65 0.70
Persuasion skills 0.67 0.56 0.72
Foreign language skills 0.62 0.63 0.61
Participation to debate tournaments 0.61 0.59 0.63
Quantitative/analytical skills 0.61 0.68 0.48
Data entry experience 0.58 0.61 0.33
Assertiveness 0.56 0.57 0.56
Participation in youth organizations 0.56 0.53 0.67
Motivation 0.55 0.57 0.53
Technical skills 0.55 0.62 0.35
Attention to detail 0.54 0.60 0.46
Teamwork 0.54 0.54 0.53
Adaptability to multicultural environments 0.54 0.54 0.53
Organizational skills 0.53 0.57 0.51
Membership for international organizations 0.52 0.52 0.54
Student club presidency 0.47 0.45 0.58
Note: Statistics derived for all 90 subjects. Subjects rated the importance of characteristics
on a scale of 1 to 6, which were later used to produce weighted averages, and subsequently
to rankings on a scale of 0 to 1 for convenience.
2.5 Conclusion
This study attempted to identify whether and how including socioemotional skills in CVs
might have an impact on selection of the CV for an interview. The results suggest that socioe-
motional skills are at least as correctly recalled as the other skills listed in the CVs, but activity-
based signals are remembered better than the adjective-based ones, suggesting a higher degree
of importance assigned to the former compared to the latter. This finding is further reinforced
by the fact that CVs with activity-based socioemotional skill signals are chosen more frequently
compared to both CVs with adjective-based signals and CVs with no socioemotional skill sig-
nals, and regression analyses show a significant effect of activity-based signals on the selection
of the CV for an interview.
The results have implications for job seekers as well as the institutions that help job seekers
in preparing their CVs. The findings suggest that the signaling of socioemotional skills matter
in the CV. However, the currently popular way of signaling socioemotional skills through ad-
jectives, for example in the taglines or summaries of CVs or LinkedIn profiles, does not seem to
be an effective way of signaling skills to potential employers. Instead, job seekers should focus
on gathering experiences that will later ensure them to signal their socioemotional skills in a
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more credible way.
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Chapter 3
Hope and Anger: An Experiment on
Inequality and Disruptive Behavior
This chapter is based on joint work with Maria Bigoni and Stefania Bortolotti.1
The extent of inequality is a decisive factor in fueling social unrest, but not all inequalities are born alike.
By means of a laboratory experiment, we investigate how the unequal distribution of monetary payoffs can
trigger disruptive behavior against people with whom there is no previous or expected future contact. In
particular, we study whether disruptive behavior depends on the levels of inequality only, or the conditions
through which inequality occurs play a role. To do so, we compare an environment in which reducing in-
equality is safe for the rich with one in which reducing inequality puts the rich in a vulnerable position. We
find that inequality triggers the poor’s disruptive behavior towards rich strangers Moreover, the experience
of the same level of inequality leads to a higher degree of frustration and disruptive behavior among the
poor, when the rich can safely reduce inequality. This behavioral change appears to be driven by a change
in the poor’s expectations on the behavior of the rich, which are more optimistic compared to the case in
which the rich are in a vulnerable position.
JEL classification: C91, D63, D83, D84, D91
Keywords: expectations, frustration, inequality aversion, punishment
3.1 Introduction
Tensions between social classes have gained a prominent role in the public arena and are
often at the center of heated political debates. The media and the rise of popular movements
such as Occupy Wall Street have increasingly given voice to these tensions. While the extent of
1IWe would like to thank Alexander Cappelen, Marco Casari, Catherine Eckel, Diego Gambetta, Werner Gu¨th,
Nikos Nikiforakis, Hans-Theo Normann, Ernesto Reuben, Arthur Schram, Ferdinand von Siemens, Matthias Sutter,
Bertil Tungodden, Daniel J. Zizzo, participants at the EWEBE Conference Bertinoro, WESSI Florence, ESA European
Meeting in Vienna, i-See Workshop in Abu Dhabi, IMEBESS Conference Florence, ESA World Meeting in Berlin, and
seminar participants at the University of Bologna, University of Torino, La Sapienza University, and Max Planck
Institute Bonn for helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper. We gratefully acknowledge
financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education. The usual disclaimer applies.
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inequality is of course a decisive factor in fueling social unrest (Stiglitz, 2012), not all inequali-
ties are born alike. What is deemed fair and acceptable can greatly depend on the process that
led to inequality (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2010; Mollerstrom et al., 2015;
Cappelen et al., 2017).
Here we study the rise of social tensions which translates into socially disruptive behav-
ior, under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, a reduction in inequality is difficult to
achieve, because the poor can take advantage of a generous act by the rich, whose kindness
exposes them to exploitation. This can happen, for instance, in societies where the institutional
environment does not grant sufficient protection to individuals. Even the most altruistic among
the rich may be reluctant to show any sign of generosity in such a context, as this would make
them too vulnerable. This in turn may induce the poor to have pessimistic expectations on the
likelihood of a reduction of inequality, and not to attribute the responsibility of inequality fully
on the rich. In the second scenario instead, effective mechanisms to prevent exploitation are in
place, and inequality can be unilaterally reduced by the rich without any risk of being abused.
If disparities prevail in this scenario, the responsibility is solely on the shoulders of the rich.
In such a scenario, the poor might have some legitimate aspirations to improve their economic
position.
Suppose for a moment that the two scenarios were characterized by the same level of in-
equality: would this give rise to the same level of socially disruptive behavior – in the form of
protests, vandalism, and violence? If social unrest is simply triggered by the degree of absolute
or relative poverty, we should not observe any difference. However, evidence from the psy-
chological literature would suggest otherwise. Anger is often rooted in frustration stemming
from disappointment of expectations (Potegal et al., 2010, Chapter 5). In our first example, we
should not observe much disruptive behavior as the poor do not quite expect a brighter future
and cannot be disappointed. Conversely, in the second scenario, the poor might have more op-
timistic expectations on the possibility of an improvement in their condition. If such a prospect
is not realized they can feel disappointed and frustrated and hence more prone to burst with
anger and engage in aggressive behavior.
While frustration of optimistic expectations might have an important role in explaining rel-
evant and potentially distressful real-world situations, it is hard to collect clean evidence on
this phenomenon in the field. Individual responsibilities are difficult to attribute, and the in-
stitutional framework cannot be easily controlled. Keeping inequality constant across contexts
can also prove challenging. In addition, it would also be difficult to control for strategic and
monetary motives triggering socially disruptive behavior. For these reasons, we move to a
tightly controlled laboratory environment.
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We develop a new zero-sum two-by-two game, the Inequality Game. The game has a unique
Nash Equilibrium, in which a “Strong” player earns 90% of the pie, leaving the “Weak” player
with a very low profit. The fundamental characteristic of the Inequality Game is that there exists
a fully equitable outcome, where players share the pie equally, which can be achieved only
if the Strong player deviates from equilibrium and chooses a strictly dominated action. In-
equality is therefore ingrained in the structure of the game and arises endogenously, as only
the Strong player has a chance of choosing between a favorable but inequitable outcome and a
perfectly even distribution.
In Experiment 1, we consider two versions of the game, aimed at capturing the essence of
the scenarios we just described. In the Simultaneous version, by choosing the dominated action,
the Strong player faces the risk of earning only 10% of the pie, if the Weak player also chooses
the off-equilibrium action. Hence, the choice of the dominant action might be driven by the fear
of exploitation, and not only by a greedy ambition. In the Sequential game, instead, this form
of strategic uncertainty is completely removed, because the Weak player moves first, hence the
Strong player can harshly punish a deviation from the Nash equilibrium. On the equilibrium
path, the Strong player can choose between a perfectly equal and a highly unequal distribution
of resources, without facing any risk of exploitation. In this sense, the Sequential game makes it
very easy for the Strong player to reduce inequality, and at the same time puts all the respon-
sibility for the final outcome on him/her. This might generate more optimistic expectations
among the Weak players. To allow players to gain experience with the game, without affecting
its one-shot nature, we let players interact repeatedly for ten rounds, with fixed roles and per-
fect stranger matching.
To study the extent of disruptive behavior in these scenarios, in two additional treatments,
we introduce the possibility to “exit” the game before it starts. Exit is socially costly as it de-
stroys all the money at stake in the game. In addition, a self-interested player should never
exit, as it is always costly to do so. It is important to stress that the choice to exit must be taken
at the beginning of each round, before playing the game, and hence before knowing the action
taken by the counterpart. Differently from other forms of direct and indirect punishment –
which have been extensively studied in the literature2 – exit is thus directed towards someone
whose past behavior is completely unknown, and can only be guessed based on the behavior
of other players in the same role. As such, exit cannot provide any motive for the Strong play-
ers to share the resources more equally, not even off the equilibrium path.3 Here the idea is
2See for instance Gu¨th et al. (1982); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000); Fehr and Fischbacher (2004); Nikiforakis (2008); Ule
et al. (2009); Balafoutas et al. (2014); Gu¨th and Kocher (2014).
3For example, while in the Ultimatum Game proposers have an incentive to increase offer to the responders if
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that frustration grows over time: one enters the first round with some hope, but then observes
that the unequal outcome is realized over and over again. This frustration cannot be unleashed
against a previous partner, whose actions are known, as exit can only affect the outcome of the
current round, where the player faces a new, completely unknown counterpart. In this sense,
we consider a form of socially disruptive behavior that is directed towards a category of people
– e.g. a “social class” or part of it – and not toward someone who is directly responsible for
the suffered harm. Under this respect, the situation we analyze is also different from the one
modeled by Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) and Bartling et al. (2015), where the direct attri-
bution of responsibility is the main driver of punishment. Our framework is closer to the one
described in Battigalli et al. (2017), where an individual’s tendency to hurt others depends on
the degree of frustration of his expectations.4
To directly assess whether the two scenarios under analysis – Simultaneous and Sequential
– in fact induce different expectations on the Strong players’ behavior, and on the realized de-
gree of inequality, in Experiment 2 we elicit beliefs by means of an incentivized procedure.
Experiment 2 involved a new set of participants, who never actually took part in the Inequality
Game but had to read the instructions and guess the actual choice made in the first round by
the participants in Experiment 1. This experiment is meant to test if the two versions of the
game – Simultaneous and Sequential – generate different expectations about the Strong players’
behavior and inequality.
We report three main results. First, data from Experiment 1 reveal that exit emerges only
after some experience of the game, and takes place more often in the Sequential than in the
Simultaneous treatment. This is true even though the level of realized inequality and Strong
players’ behavior is not significantly different across treatments. Second, we look at individual
experiences and the choice to exit the game. Weak players’ decision to exit in one round is
strongly correlated with their experience in previous rounds. In particular, being repeatedly
matched with Strong players who never act generously is positively associated with the use of
exit. Interestingly, this effect is much more pronounced in the Sequential treatment where the
Strong players have an easy option to equalize the payoffs. This finding suggests that there is
more to exit than just the absolute level of inequality. Third, we find support for the idea that
the mismatch between expectations and realized outcomes is a major contributor for the deci-
sion to engage in costly punishment against an individual with unknown history. Results from
Experiment 2 indicate that subjects expect the Strong players to choose the generous action
more often in the Sequential treatment. Since subjects in the two experiments are drawn from
they fear that they will reject, such a strategic incentive is not present in our set-up.
4Persson (2018) and Aina et al. (2018) provide the first experimental tests of the theory in Battigalli et al. (2017).
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the same pool of participants, that suggest that participants in Experiment 1 also had higher
hopes for a more equal distribution of earnings in Sequential than Simultaneous. An implica-
tion of our study is that initial expectations about the likelihood of an equal outcome plays a
strong role in reaction to inequality, and that if the difference between expectations and reality
is wider, then we might expect much stronger reactions to inequality than what the absolute
inequality level itself might suggest.
Our design allows us to investigate an overlooked form of reaction to inequality. Previ-
ous literature suggests that inequality leads to conflict, vendetta behavior, riots, and extreme
forms of intergroup punishment (Abbink et al., 2011; Abbink, 2012; Bolle et al., 2014; Eckel
et al., 2016), and that intentions and the source of inequality are important in punishment and
money burning (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003; Fehr, 2015). The defining feature of the
form of disruptive behavior we investigate in this study is the fact that it is directed towards
individuals whom the subject has no information about. In this sense, the only study close to
ours is Lacomba et al. (2014), which investigates post-conflict behavior where conflict is created
through a Tullock contest. The study includes one treatment in which losers of the contest can
decide to burn money before knowing how much the winner of the contest will appropriate.
The primary difference between Lacomba et al. (2014) and our study lies in the research ques-
tion we answer. While Lacomba et al. (2014) design is not suited to see how expectations affect
disruptive behavior, we explicitly manipulate the expectations of Weak player on Strong player
behavior. In addition, when they decide whether to burn money, the losers in Lacomba et al.
(2014) know they will inevitably be poorer than the winners, whereas the players in our design
make their decision in a position where an equitable outcome is possible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains our novel game, the exit option,
and the experimental procedures. Section 3.3 presents the results of the experiment. Section
3.4 details the design and results of Experiment 2. Section 3.5 discusses the implications of our
findings and concludes.
3.2 Inequality game and exit: design
In the first experiment, we implemented a 2×2 between-subject design. We exogenously
manipulated two dimensions: the sequence of play – Simultaneous vs. Sequential – and the avail-
ability of an exit option – Control vs. Exit. In the remainder of this section, we first describe the
two variants of the Inequality Game. We then move to the exit option and finally we turn to the
matching protocol, feedback, and procedures.
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Figure 3.1: The Inequality Game
(a) Simultaneous game (b) Sequential game
The Inequality Game. To endogenously generate inequality, we developed a novel 2-by-2
asymmetric zero-sum game that we dub the Inequality Game. The game involves a Strong and a
Weak player.5 The Strong player can choose between Up and Down and the Weak one between
Left and Right: the payoffs (expressed ine) are reported in Figure 3.1. In the Simultaneous treat-
ment, both players decide at the same time, while in the Sequential, the Weak player decides
first. In the latter treatment, we used the contingent method for Strong players, so that they
had to make a decision for both nodes.
To allow subjects to gain experience, the inequality game is repeated for a total of 10 periods
divided in two phases of equal length. At the end of each period, participants received feedback
about the action adopted by their counterpart, and the payoffs in the pair. Roles were fixed over
the entire duration of the experiment and there were exactly 10 Strong and 10 Weak players in
each session. We used a perfect-strangers matching protocol and players were never matched
together more than once.
Feedback and matching were designed so to strip away any possibility of forming an indi-
vidual reputation, and hence, to rule out any form of direct or indirect reciprocity. Four sets of
5 players were formed at the beginning of the experiment: two sets of Strong players and two
sets of Weak players. In Phase 1, each set of Strong players was matched with a set of Weak
players, to form a 10-player “matching-group”. In the five periods of Phase 1, each Strong
player was paired once and only once with each Weak player in his/her matching group. At
the end of Phase 1, participants were informed about the average earnings for the Strong and
the Weak players in their matching group, but they did not receive any feedback on the out-
5The instructions were framed neutrally and the players were referred to as Red and Blue.
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Figure 3.2: Matching in Phase 1 and Phase 2
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comes realized in the other matching group. In Phase 2, each set of Strong players was matched
with the set of Weak players they had not met in Phase 1 (Figure 3.2). This implies that, at the
beginning of Phase 2, subjects had some aggregate information on the history of play of the
other players in their own set in Phase 1, but no information on the set of players they would
be matched with in the next five periods.
The exit option. In the Exit treatments, all participants – regardless of their role – were given
the chance to exit the game before making any decision for the current round. If at least one of
the two participants in the pair decided to exit, both players earned e0. Hence, the exit option
is harmful for both players and socially costly as it generates a Pareto-dominated outcome. The
choice to exit could only be taken before playing the game and, therefore, before having any
information about the action taken by the other player: when they decided whether to exit or
not, participants had no information on the history of play of their counterpart, and they could
only rely on their own previous experiences with different counterparts. At the end of each
period, subjects were informed whether their counterpart chose to exit, but participants that
implemented the exit option could not see the choices made by their counterpart, in terms of
either exit or actions. At the end of Phase 1, that is after the first 5 periods, participants were
also informed about the total number of exits by the Strong and by the Weak players in their
matching-group.
Procedures. 240 subjects equally divided into 12 sessions – 3 for each treatment – participated
in the experiment that was conducted at Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER)
in May 2017. Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was
programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Figure 3.3 provides the sequence of events in the
experiment. Upon arrival, participants were randomly seated in a cubicle. Instructions were
read aloud to ensure common knowledge and a paper copy of the instructions was distributed
to participants.6 An alphanumeric code was distributed together with the instructions and
6The experiment was run in English and that was announced in the recruitment message.
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participants were asked to enter it on their computer at the beginning of the experiment. The
code revealed the role – Strong or Weak player – assigned to the participant. In all sessions and
before the Inequality Game, there was a team task meant to foster a sense of “group identity”.
In the team task, participants interacted only with other participants of their same color; hence
two teams of ten were formed.7
Figure 3.3 summarizes the eight steps of the experiment. In the first two steps, the role
was assigned and the team task was performed. Step 3 included five periods of the stage game
(Phase 1) and was followed by aggregate results at the matching-group level. In step 5, subjects
were moved to a new matching-group and in step 6 five more periods of the Inequality Game
were played (Phase 2). Aggregate results about Phase 2 were then provided and as a final step
a computerized questionnaire was administered.
Figure 3.3: Timeline of the experiment
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At the end of the experiment, a computerized questionnaire was administrated. The ques-
tionnaire included some socio-demographic questions and a personality test (Ashton and Lee,
2009). To reduce any hedging problem, we paid only two periods. At the end of the experi-
ments, one period from phase 1 and another period from phase 2 were selected at random for
payment. Payments ranged from e6 to e26, with an average of e15.50, including a e4 show-
up fee. A session lasted 50 minutes on average.
3.2.1 Theoretical predictions
The Inequality Game is dominance-solvable and has the same, unique Nash Equilibrium
outcome (Right, Up) in the Sequential and the Simultaneous versions. The equilibrium payoffs
are e9 for the Strong and e1 for the Weak player. In addition, self-interested profit maximizer
players – both Strong and Weak – should never use the exit option as it always implies some
cost and can bring no material benefit. So, according to a standard game-theoretical approach,
7The task consisted of solving math problems to reveal a picture hidden on the subjects’ screen. Participants
were asked to add up three two-digit numbers and every time a member of the team submitted a correct answer,
one more piece of the picture behind the box was revealed. If the team task was successfully completed within 150
seconds, each team member earned e2; all teams succeeded.
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we should not observe any behavioral difference across treatments.
Even though the payoffs in equilibrium are highly unequal, it is important to notice that a
perfectly equitable outcome exists. The equal split, however, can be achieved only if the Strong
player chooses a strictly dominated action. The two treatments – Simultaneous and Sequential –
fundamentally differ in the way the equitable outcome can be reached. A fair-minded Strong
player can play Down in the Simultaneous game in the hope to reach the equal split (Down-
Right). However, a self-interested Weak player could anticipate that and play Left, hence leav-
ing the Strong player with only 10% of the total wealth (Down-Left). Strong players can thus
choose Up not only because they are self-interested but also out of strategic concerns. Such a
tension is not present in the Sequential version of the game where the equitable outcome can be
safely chosen.
To capture this difference, we derive alternative predictions based on the assumption of
inequality aversion a` la Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assuming that the utility is a function of own
payoffs and the distance between own and others’ material payoffs. We denote by α and β the
parameters that capture an individual’s sensitivity toward disadvantageous and advantageous
inequality, respectively. For the sake of brevity, we relegate all proofs to Appendix 3.B.
Control treatments. We first characterize the predictions for the Strong players. In both vari-
ants of the game, Strong players who do not care much about inequality (β ≤ 1/2) always
play Nash (Up), while those who are averse to favorable inequality (α ≥ β > 1/2) might play
out-of-equilibrium (Down). More specifically, in the Sequential treatment, a Strong player with
α ≥ β > 1/2 always plays Down in response to Right, as the sub-game corresponds to a mini
Dictator Game.8 However, in the Simultaneous treatment, a player with α ≥ β > 1/2 plays
Down only if he/she expects the Weak player to choose Right with a sufficiently high proba-
bility. In this sense, the model captures the tension between equalizing payoffs and strategic
uncertainty in the Simultaneous treatment well: inequality averse Strong players might decide
not to act kindly simply because they are afraid of being exploited by their counterpart. This
tension is not present in the Sequential treatment.
It is straightforward to see that Weak players should always play Nash (Right) in the Se-
quential treatment, regardless of their degree of inequality aversion. On the other hand, in the
Simultaneous treatment the Weak players who do not care much about advantageous inequality
(low β) and who attach a sufficiently large probability to the event that Strong chooses out-of-
equilibrium (Down) will play Left in the attempt to exploit the Strong player.
8Strong players will always play Up in response to Left, for any α ≥ β ≥ 0.
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Exit treatments. The introduction of the exit option should not affect the behavior of the
Strong players, who should never exit the game, and play as they would do in the Control treat-
ments. However, the exit option can be rationalized for inequality-averse Weak players having
preferences that are compatible with the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). More specifically,
players with a sufficiently large β may choose to exit both in the Sequential and in the Simultane-
ous version of the game, if they have pessimistic expectations about the behavior of the Strong
player – i.e., they expect their counterpart to play Up. Instead, for Weak players who are less
pessimistic, and very sensitive to disadvantageous but not to advantageous inequality, there
may be a substitution effect between the exit option and Left in the Simultaneous treatment,
where Weak players can try to escape the unequal outcome by playing Left, rather than exit-
ing. This cannot happen in the Sequential treatment. To sum up, if expectations on the behavior
of the Strong players are the same under the Simultaneous and Sequential versions of the game,
exit should take place less often in the Simultaneous treatment. However, the predicted treat-
ment effect on Exit can go in either direction, depending on the players’ expectations on their
counterparts’ actions. If Weak players are more optimistic on the Strong players’ willingness
to choose ”down” in the Sequential treatment, they should be less willing to Exit. On the other
hand, if Weak players are pessimistic about an equal division, they may be more likely to exit.
Fehr and Schmidt’s theory does not provide any intuition on how beliefs may be affected by
the treatment.
While Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model of inequality aversion can predict the adoption of
the exit option, it does not make clear-cut predictions on whether exit should be more preva-
lent in the Simultaneous or Sequential version of the Inequality Game, so it does not support our
initial intuition that there should be more anger, hence more socially disruptive behavior, when
responsibility can be clearly attributed to the Strong players and expectations are more likely
to be disappointed. To better capture this intuition, we rely on the insights of a recent model
proposed by Battigalli et al. (2017). The main idea of this theoretical framework is that anger
is anchored in frustration, that is the result of unfulfilled expectations. Angry players can be
eager to sacrifice their own material payoffs to harm another (possibly innocent) player.
Consider again our experimental setting where a Weak player enters the game in round 1
having some expectations about the stream of future monetary payoff. In line with the model
by Battigalli et al. (2017), at the beginning of the game, player i has a contingent plan and ex-
pectations about player j, and frustration is defined as the difference between the payoff player
i expected ex-ante and the maximal attainable payoff ex-post. It is important to stress that the
reduction in expected payoff must be both unexpected and beyond the control of player i. Sup-
pose the Weak players in the Simultaneous treatment recognize the strategic uncertainty faced
by the Strong player and realize that the payoff will always be very unequal. The Weak players
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in the Sequential treatment might instead have good reasons to ex-ante believe that a sizable
fraction of the Strong players will behave nicely and split the money equally. As the game
progresses, the Weak player might observe extremely unequal outcomes over and over again
in both treatments. This experience would generate a higher frustration in the Sequential treat-
ment, where he has more optimistic expectations, and this feeling can turn into anger which
translates into socially disruptive behavior. In line with the idea that frustration triggers anger,
the disruptive and punitive behavior can be targeted towards someone that is not necessarily
responsible for generating the initial disappointment. That is exactly what happens when a
subject exits the game, as the decision is taken before the counterpart has made a move and
without having any information about the past behavior of this person.9
3.3 Inequality game and exit: results
This section is organized around two main parts. In the first, we present the aggregate
results and treatment effects. In the second part, we dig deeper into individual-level behavior
and focus on the use of the exit option conditional on the personal experience in the game.
3.3.1 Aggregate behavior and treatment effect
We start by studying whether and how frequently the exit option is adopted and if there
is a difference between Simultaneous and Sequential treatments. We then move to the behavior
of Weak and Strong players in Exit treatments. Finally, we assess the aggregate effect of the
introduction of the exit option on behavior and outcomes, by comparing results from the Exit
and Control treatments.
Adoption of the exit option. In line with the theoretical predictions, we hardly observe any
exit behavior by the Strong players. The exit option was used only once out of 600 times. In-
stead, a non-negligible fraction of Week players used the exit option in both treatments (Figure
3.4). In the first phase the share of exit is similar in the two treatments (6% and 7% in Simulta-
neous and Sequential, respectively), yet the gap widens in the second phase when Weak players
exit more than twice as often in Sequential than in Simultaneous (17% vs 7%). Overall, the share
of Weak players choosing the exit option is almost twice as high in Sequential (12%) compared
to Simultaneous (7%). In both treatments, about 30% of the Weak players used the exit option
at least once.10 To formally test if there is a gap in exit between the two treatments, we run a
9One may argue that in our experiment, subjects do not know what their current opponent has done in the past,
but may form beliefs on it based on their previous experiences. So exit could be also seen as a form of targeted
punishment, based on a sort of statistical discrimination. To our knowledge, there is no formal model that would
capture this specific type of behavior.
10The maximum observed number of exists for a single player over the 10 periods is 4 in Simultaneous and 6 in
Sequential. Weak players that exit more than once are 17% in Simultaneous and 30% in Sequential.
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Figure 3.4: Actions of Weak players in the Exit treatments
panel linear regression where the dependent variable is the average exit per period and ses-
sion (Model 1 in Table 3.1). We find evidence that the share of exit increases over periods.
Importantly, this increase is significantly more prominent in the Sequential treatment (Period x
Sequential in the regression), hence leading to a positive treatment effect over time.
Result 1. Weak players’ adoption of the exit option increases with experience, and more so in the Se-
quential compared to the Simultaneous treatment.
Weak players behavior. As suggested by the theoretical framework, a reason why the exit
option is chosen more frequently in the Sequential than in the Simultaneous treatment may be
that, in the latter, aversion to disadvantageous inequality may induce Weak players to choose
Left rather then Exit, if they expect Strong to play Down sufficiently often. In the Sequential
treatment, instead, Left should never be played, so Exit is the only alternative for Weak players
who want to avoid a highly unequal outcome. The same reasoning does not apply to the Se-
quential game where a Weak player does not have any way to try to exploit the generosity of
the Strong player. To test if this can explain the difference across treatments, we run a panel lin-
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Table 3.1: Behavior in the Exit treatments.
Weak player Strong player
Exit Left Right (NE) Up (NE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sequential tr. (d) -0.038 -0.042 0.080 -0.071
(0.051) (0.056) (0.072) (0.054)
Period 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Period × Seq. 0.017** 0.002 -0.019** 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.033 0.104*** 0.862*** 0.847***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.051) (0.038)
N.obs. 60 60 60 60
R-squared (overall) 0.332 0.035 0.176 0.101
Notes: Models 1 to 4 report results from panel linear regressions with session-
level random effects. In Model 1, the dependent variable is the average share of
exits by session and period. In Model 2, the dependent variable is the average
share of Weak choosing Left by session and period. In Model 3, the dependent
variable is the average share of Weak choosing Right (Nash) by session and pe-
riod. In Model 4, the dependent variable is the share of Strong playing Up (Nash).
For the sequential game we consider only the Right contingency (irrespectively
of the actual choice of Weak – Left or Right). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
ear regression where the dependent variable is the average Left per period and session (Model
2 in Table 3.1). We fail to provide support to the idea that Weak players choose to play Left
significantly more often in Simultaneous than in Sequential.
While the treatment effect on exit is not unequivocally predicted by the theory (as there can
be some substitution between Exit and Left), the theory is clear on the fact that Right in Sequen-
tial must be more frequent than, or at least as frequent as, in Simultaneous.11 Model 3 in Table
3.1 tests if this prediction is verified in the data. The dependent variable is the average of Right
(Nash) choices per period and session. We do not find support for the idea that Weak players
play Nash more often in Sequential than Simultaneous. If anything, the share of Weak players
who play Right decreases over time with the decline more marked for the Sequential treatment,
and the difference is statistically significant (see Period x Sequential). In other words, the reason
why Exit is more prevalent in the Sequential treatment does not lie in a form of “substitution”
between Exit and Left. The exit option seems to be adopted by players who – in the Simultane-
ous treatment – would have played Right.
So far, we have established that Weak players use exit more often in the Sequential treatment
compared to the Simultaneous one, and that this difference is not just driven by a substitution
effect. The remainder of this section investigates the possible causes of this treatment difference
11This result is derived under the assumption that the beliefs about the Strong players behavior are the same
across treatments. We will discuss the implications of a departure from this assumption in section 3.4.
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in the use of exit.
Strong players’ behavior. We now focus on the Strong players to see whether their behavior
is different across treatments. It may in fact be possible to explain the treatment difference in
the use of exit by the Strong players’ behavior, if Strong players were more prone to behave al-
truistically (i.e., out-of-equilibrium) in the Simultaneous rather than in the Sequential treatment.
If this is true, the difference in exit could simply be the result of different levels of inequal-
ity endogenously generated in the game. However, our data do not support this hypothesis:
Strong players chose Up 86% of the times in the Simultaneous and 81% in the Sequential treat-
ment.12 Model 4 in Table 3.1 reports a panel regression where the dependent variable is the
average number of Right plays per session and period. While we fail to find any treatment dif-
ference, it is interesting to notice that, if anything, Strong players are slightly more likely to act
altruistically in Sequential than Simultaneous. This is quite in line with the idea that Strong play-
ers should be more likely to deviate from Nash when there is no risk of being exploited by the
counterpart, which could in principle work to decrease the exit propensity of the Weak players.
Consequences of the introduction of the exit option. To understand the impact of the exit
option on Strong and Weak players’ behavior, we compare the Exit treatments with the Con-
trol treatments where the exit option is not available. As described in the previous section, the
availability of the exit option should not affect the behavior of the Strong players.
Considering both the Simultaneous and the Sequential treatments, together, we observe that
82% of Strong players in Control compared to 84% in Exit play Up. In the first period, 77% in
the Control treatment compared to 78% in the Exit treatments play Up. Models 3 and 6 in Table
3.2 provide further evidence that the introduction of an exit option does not change the behav-
ior of the Strong players in both the Simultaneous and the Sequential treatments. This finding
suggests that Strong players do understand that they should not react to the introduction of
the exit option, as a kind action cannot dissuade the counterpart from exiting the game – recall
that the decision to exit is taken before even seeing the decision of the Strong player.
Result 2. Strong players’ behavior is not statistically different across treatments and it is not affected
by the introduction of the exit option.
12In the Simultaneous treatment, Strong players can choose between Up (Nash) and Down and make only one
decision in each period. In the Sequential treatment instead, we use the contingent response method and the Strong
players have to decide for each possible node of the game. Since the Right node is selected in the vast majority of
the instances (92%), we only report data for the Right node, irrespectively of which node was actually reached.
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The percentage of Weak players choosing Right is 87 in the Control treatments compared
to 84 in the Exit treatments. Table 3.2 also reports results for OLS estimations for Weak player
behavior, and the dependent variables are Left (Model 1 and 4) and Right (Model 2 and 5),
separately for Simultaneous and Sequential. In line with the predictions, we observe less Left in
Simultaneous when exit is possible as compared to the situation in which such an opportunity
is not available. Quite surprisingly, we observe more Right in Exit treatment; however, the dif-
ference manifests itself only in the first periods of the game.
Table 3.2: Comparison between the Exit and Control treatments.
Simultaneous treatments Sequential treatments
Left Right (NE) Up (NE) Left Right (NE) Up (NE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Exit tr. (d) -0.173*** 0.140** 0.020 -0.024 0.029 0.042
(0.064) (0.064) (0.048) (0.048) (0.066) (0.081)
Period -0.017*** 0.017*** 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Exit tr. x Period 0.013 -0.019** -0.002 0.001 -0.023*** -0.003
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
N.obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared (overall) 0.269 0.134 0.028 0.024 0.361 0.061
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report results from panel linear regressions with session-level random ef-
fects. In Models 1 and 4, the dependent variable is the average share of Weak players choosing
Left by session and period. In Models 2 and 5, the dependent variable is the average share of
Weak players playing Right (Nash). In Models 3 and 6, the dependent variable is the average
share of Strong players playing Up (Nash). For the sequential game we consider only the Right
contingency (irrespectively of the actual choice of Weak – Left or Right). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.3.2 Individual history and exit
One possible explanation for the difference in exit behavior across treatments could be the
individual history observed by each player. Even though there is no difference across treat-
ments in Strong player behavior at the aggregate level, it is still important to check for indi-
vidual experience. To test for individual-level history, we focus on the subsample of players
who were never matched with a Strong player who played out-of-equilibrium (Down) at any
time t (Figure 3.5). In the initial period of the game, we include all players as none of them
has yet observed any deviation form equilibrium. In any subsequent period t, we only include
Weak players who never saw a kind action of their matched partner from period 1 throughout
period t − 1.13 Figure 3.5 presents the use of exit over time for this subset of Weak players
that share a common history. Conditionally on having observed the same (unfair) history, exit
13That is the case if the Strong players in previous interactions always chose Nash. However, it can also be the
case that a Weak player has chosen to exit in one of the previous t − 1 periods. In fact, in such a case the Weak
player is not given any information about the behavior of the counterpart. This feature of our design does prevent
a Weak player to update his beliefs about Strong players behavior in case of exit.
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is much more prominent in Sequential than in Simultaneous. If anything, after controlling for
individual-level histories, the gap between the two treatments is even more pronounced and it
manifests itself already in phase 1. On the other hand, the frequency of exit for the remaining
Weak players, as shown in Figure 3.7 in Appendix 3.A, does not provide any evidence of a
treatment difference.
We corroborate these findings through regressions. Table 3.4 in Appendix 3.A reports the
marginal effects from probit regressions on exit choices of Weak players, with random effects
at the subject level. Models 1, 2, and 3 clearly show an incremental treatment effect such that
Weak players who always observed Up in all previous periods until t− 1 are increasingly more
likely to exit in period t. On the other hand, no such effect is visible for the remaining Weak
players, as seen in Models 4, 5, and 6.
Table 3.3 shows the marginal effects from panel probit regressions on the exit choices of
Weak players, with one observation per subject and period, and random effects at the individ-
ual level. We include the number of times the Weak player was matched with a Strong player
who chose Down in the earlier periods (Observed Down). Recall that choosing Down signals
the Strong player’s intention to share equally. Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.3 shows that Weak
players who have observed Down in the previous periods are in fact significantly less likely to
exit, and this effect is more pronounced in the Sequential treatment, especially in Phase 2.
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Figure 3.5: Frequency of exit for Weak players who never observed Down (out-of-equilibrium)
Notes: The horizontal axis reports the period within each phase, and the vertical axis reports
the frequency of exit. Panel on the left provides the frequencies for phase 1, and the panel on
the right for phase 2. The solid line is for the Simultaneous treatment, whereas the dashed line
is for the Sequential. Labels on the lines provide the number of observations corresponding
to that frequency. The number of observations decreases across periods since Weak players
who observe a Down at time t are excluded from the analysis starting from time t + 1.
At the end of Phase 1, players were informed about the average earnings for the Weak mem-
bers of their own group and the average earnings for the 5 Strong players of the matched set. In
Models 3 and 5, we include the ratio between these two averages (Payoff ratio (ph1)). A ratio of
one implies equal earnings across the two groups. A ratio smaller than 1 indicates that Strong
players were ahead and the smaller the ratio, the larger the inequality between the two groups.
The idea behind this regressor is that Weak players who see a larger ratio (i.e., less inequality)
in the first phase might be less likely to use the exit option in the second phase. Both Models 3
and 5 show that Weak players are less likely to exit in the Sequential as the payoff ratio of Weak
players in Phase 1 increases.
Before the beginning of Phase 2, players also receive information on the number of times
the exit option was adopted by the members of their own and their matched set in Phase 1. In
Models 4 and 5 we study whether observing a higher number of exits by fellow Weak players
in Phase 1 induces Weak players to exit more often in Phase 2. Results suggest that this sort of
bandwagon effect is not present in our data.
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Result 3. Similar individual-level experiences induce more exit in Sequential than Simultaneous.
Table 3.3: Individual-level history and the exit option (marginal effects)
Exit (Yes=1 and No=0)
Only Weak players
Phase 1 only Phase 2 only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Sequential tr. (d) -0.064 0.117* 0.363*** 0.047 0.442***
(0.083) (0.069) (0.119) (0.121) (0.135)
Period 0.026** 0.021** 0.018* 0.019* 0.021**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Period × Seq. 0.029 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.008
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Observed Down -0.051* -0.027* -0.040***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.012)
Obs. Down × Seq. -0.071 -0.086** -0.045
(0.078) (0.034) (0.038)
Payoff ratio (ph.1) 0.187 0.263
(0.404) (0.530)
Payoff ratio (ph.1) × Seq. -1.590*** -1.249**
(0.495) (0.610)
Exit by other Weak in Ph.1 -0.054 -0.042
(0.035) (0.030)
Exit by other Weak in Ph.1×
Seq.
0.022 -0.029
(0.045) (0.033)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 240 300 300 300 300
Notes: Models 1 to 5 report the marginal effects from panel probit regressions on exit choices
of Weak players, with random effects at the subject level. The dependent variable takes value
1 if Weak chooses Exit and 0 otherwise. Model 1 includes only Phase 1, Models 2 to 5 include
Phase 2 only. Controls for individual characteristics include age and the number of mistakes
made in the control questions, and a set of dummies for: male, political orientation (indi-
cating self-reported right-wing political views), non-German subjects, field of study (social
sciences, hard sciences, and humanities). Standard errors robust for clustering at the session
level (in parentheses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
3.4 The drivers of exit: expectations
We have documented a treatment difference in exit behavior. Disruptive behavior in the
form of exit grows over time and this is true only for the Sequential treatment, where in Phase 2,
exit is more than double than in the Simultaneous treatment. The gap in exit between treatments
is alive and well even when juxtaposing participants with comparable individual-level expe-
riences of inequality. This suggests that there must be something more than the mere outcomes.
This pattern cannot be explained by inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) unless
Weak players’ expectations on others’ behavior also change in a direction that is opposite to
what one would expect. To rationalize the across treatment difference, Weak players should
expect Strong players to be nicer – i.e., choosing Down – in Simultaneous than Sequential. If that
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was the case, the higher levels of exit in the Sequential treatment could be explained by inequal-
ity aversion. An alternative explanation, which builds on the intuition developed by Battigalli
et al. (2017), is that the exit divide can be explained by a mismatch between expectations and
realized outcomes in the game where Strong players could easily opt for the equal outcome.
This explanation hinges on the hypothesis that Weak players are more optimistic about Strong
players’ behavior in Sequential than in Simultaneous.
Experimental design. To test these two alternative mechanisms, we run a follow-up exper-
iment with a new sample of participants who did not take part in Experiment 1. We invited
122 subjects not familiar with Experiment 1 and we asked them to read the instructions of the
original experiment. Each subject was exposed to either the simultaneous or the sequential
version of the Inequality Game. They all read the instructions for the relevant treatment with an
exit option. After reading the instructions, participants were asked to make two guesses: the
number of Strong players who selected Up in the first round, and the number of Weak players
who selected Right in the first round out of 10 players who did not exit. Both estimates had
to be an integer between 0 and 10. The belief elicitation task was incentivized according to a
quadratic scoring rule (see Instructions in Appendix 3.C). Estimates were compared with data
from previous sessions of Experiment 1. In particular, we had a random draw of 10 Strong and
10 Weak players that was performed at the individual level to avoid informational spill-overs
across sessions.
Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from the same pool as the one of Ex-
periment 1. We run 2 sessions for each between-subjects treatment at CLER in April 2018. After
reading the instructions, participants had to answer the same set of 10 control questions used
in Experiment 1. To ensure that participants carefully read and understood the instructions,
we paid them e0.20 for each control question correctly answered at the first try. Only one of
the two guesses selected at random at the end of the experiment was relevant for payments.
Earnings ranged from e5.50 to e19, with an average of e15.50, including a e4 show-up fee. A
session lasted 45 minutes on average.
Results for Experiment 2. Figure 3.6 reports the distribution of expectations divided by player
type and treatment. Results show that, between the Simultaneous and Sequential treatments,
subjects have different prior beliefs for both Strong and Weak player actions in the first period.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of guesses for the number of Strong players who
chose Up for the two treatments, and Panel (b) shows the distribution of guesses for the num-
ber of Weak players who chose Right for the two treatments.14 Mean guess for the number of
14For the Sequential treatment, subjects make their guess on Strong player actions conditional on the Weak player
selecting Right.
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Strong players who select Up in the first period is 8.2 for the Simultaneous treatment, whereas
it decreases to 7.5 for the Sequential treatment (p = 0.045, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). In other
words, ex ante, subjects expect Strong players to choose Down and hence be more inclined to
reduce inequality more often in the Sequential compared to the Simultaneous treatments. Mean
guess for the number of Weak players who select Right in the first period is 6.8 for the Simulta-
neous treatment and it is 7.4 for the Sequential treatment (p = 0.011, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). In
other words, our participants in Experiment 2 can clearly recognize the fact that in the Simulta-
neous game Weak players can try to exploit Strong players with the hope of securing a higher
payoff for themselves.
Figure 3.6: Expectations about Strong and Weak player actions
(a) Strong players expected to choose Up (b) Weak players expected to choose Right
Altogether, these results suggest that subjects perceive an equitable outcome as much more
likely in the Sequential than in the Simultaneous treatment. In other words, Weak players are
more hopeful to be treated fairly when Strong players can unilaterally choose the equal split
without any fear of being exploited. Our results are compatible with the idea that frustrated
expectations can lead to more disruptive behavior, and this behavior can even be directed to-
wards someone that is not necessarily the cause of such frustration. In this sense, explanations
based on models of frustrations and anger (Battigalli et al., 2017) can better account for the gap
in exit behavior compared to models of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Result 4. Subjects expect the Strong players to deviate more from the Nash equilibrium and play more
generously in the Sequential than in the Simultaneous treatment.
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3.5 Conclusion
Understanding the mechanisms that lead to social unrest under high inequality is impor-
tant to provide effective solutions to its social consequences. In this study, we contribute to this
attempt by creating an environment with endogenous high inequality, and investigating the
response to the change in ex ante expectations about an equitable outcome.
Our findings suggest that the mismatch between expectations and realized outcomes is a
major contributor for the decision to engage in costly punishment against an individual with
unknown history. In other words, if the difference between expectations and reality is wider,
then we might expect much stronger reactions to inequality than what the absolute inequality
level itself might suggest. This result is in line with the theoretical framework by Battigalli et al.
(2017), where frustration occurs as a result of the difference between expectations and realized
outcomes, and leads to anger. Testing for the differences in ex ante expectations through belief
elicitation sessions, we find evidence that when there is no strategic risk of sharing, Weak play-
ers do expect Strong players to share payoffs equally more often. Given that outcomes are not
different in the two games, Weak players experience a stronger disappointment in the Sequential
treatment, resulting in a higher degree of frustration and thus exit. Our framework is closer to
the form of “simple anger” described in Battigalli et al. (2017), where an individual’s tendency
to hurt others depends on the degree of frustration of his expectations, but not necessarily on
whether the frustration was generated by the target of the aggressive behavior or someone else.
The positive treatment effect is quite a remarkable result if one bears in mind that there is
no chance of meeting the same Strong player again and, most importantly, Weak players know
nothing about the history of the Strong player.15 It could well be the case that a Weak player
exits when being paired with a fair-minded player with a history of equal shares. The possi-
bility of committing a false negative – i.e., punish someone who does not deserve it – should
lower the punishment levels.16 On the other hand, this result may in fact speak to a broader
phenomenon than the stylized environment we create in the laboratory. For example, investi-
gating the reasons behind the prevalence of engineers among the suicide bombers coming from
the Middle East, Gambetta and Hertog (2009, 2016) find the main driving force as the difference
between young engineering graduates’ high expectations at the beginning of their study and
the realities of unemployment or underemployment they face after graduation.
While the study provides insight on what drives socially disruptive behavior under high
15Yang et al. (2016) find evidence that inequality aversion model has less predictive power on behavior when
reciprocity is possible, but the study depicts a case of direct reciprocity.
16Cappelen et al. (2017) and Markussen et al. (2016) report evidence that people tend to be false negative averse.
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inequality, it leaves some further questions open for investigation. The first of these questions
might be on the discrepancy between the Strong and Weak player attribution of responsibility.
While Weak players seem to regard the same inequality levels differently under our two treat-
ments, Strong players do not respond to the institutional environment providing them safety
when they decide to be fair. Furthermore, effort in disentangling statistical discrimination from
simple anger as conceptualized in Battigalli et al. (2017) is needed. Finally, our framework does
not allow us to identify how much the transparency of intentions play a role in Weak player de-
cisions. In the Simultaneous treatment, selfish Strong players may hide behind the institutional
structure when they do not share, but this is not possible in the Sequential treatment. Weak
players may also respond to this transparency of intentions when they exit more often in the
Sequential treatment.
3.A Tables and figures
Table 3.4: Individual histories and exit behavior
Exit option (Only Weak players, Yes=1 and No=0)
Never observed Down Observed Down at least once
Phase 1 only Phase 2 only All phases Phase 1 only Phase 2 only All phases
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Period 0.022*** 0.005 0.016** 0.044 0.045*** 0.041**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.042) (0.016) (0.016)
Sequential -0.099 -0.093 -0.086 -0.121 0.187 0.098
(0.077) (0.100) (0.070) (0.240) (0.141) (0.081)
Period × Seq. 0.038* 0.060*** 0.036** 0.015 -0.035 -0.026
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.044) (0.026) (0.026)
Phase 2 (d) 0.017 0.060***
(0.026) (0.018)
Phase 2 × Seq. 0.104** 0.053
(0.043) (0.089)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 213 93 306 64 177 248
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the marginal effects from probit regressions on exit choices of Weak players, with
random effects at the subject level. The dependent variable takes value 1 if Weak chooses Exit and 0 otherwise.
Models 1 and 4 include Phase 1 only, Models 2 and 5 include Phase 2 only, Models 3 and 6 include both phases.
In all models except Model 4, controls for individual characteristics include age and the number of mistakes made
in the control questions, and a set of dummies for: male, political orientation (indicating self-reported right-wing
political views), non-German subjects, field of study (social sciences, hard sciences, and humanities). In Model
4, controls for individual characteristics include age and the number of mistakes made in the control questions,
and a set of dummies for: political orientation (indicating self-reported right-wing political views), non-German
subjects, field of study (social sciences, hard sciences, and humanities). The difference in Model 4 is because only
male subjects exited in Phase 1. Standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in parentheses). Symbols
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Frequency of exit for Weak players who saw at least one Down
Notes: The horizontal axis reports the period within each phase, and the vertical axis reports
the frequency of exit. Panel on the left provides the frequencies for Phase 1, and the panel on
the right for Phase 2. The solid line is for the Simultaneous treatment, whereas the dashed line
is for the Sequential. Labels on the lines provide the number of observations corresponding
to that frequency. Number of observations increase across periods since the number of Weak
players with a constant history of having observed Up (NE) from period 1 throughout period
t− 1 decreases whenever they are matched with a Strong player who plays Down.
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3.B Theoretical predictions
Standard game-theoretical predictions trivially suggest a unique Nash equilibrium in which
the Weak player chooses Right and the Strong player chooses Up, irrespective of whether the
game is played simultaneously or sequentially. The exit option is never used.
Under the assumption of inequality aversion, we consider a utility function of the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) type, where utility for player i is given by
Ui(x) =
{
xi − β(xi − xj) i f xi ≥ xj
xi − α(xj − xi) i f xi < xj
where x = xi, xj denotes a vector of monetary payoffs for players i and j and α and β represents
the sensitivity toward disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We assume that α ≥ β
and 0 ≤ β < 1.
We denote with pright be the expected probability attached to the event that Weak plays
Right and pup the expected probability that Strong plays Up. We derive equilibrium predic-
tions based on α, β, pright, pup.
One threshold, γ, is relevant for deriving the theoretical predictions for the Strong players:
γ1 =
9 + 8α− 10β
5 + 8α− 2β (3.1)
Three thresholds, θ, are relevant for deriving the theoretical predictions for the Weak play-
ers:
θ1 =
4− 8β
5 + 2α− 8β (3.2)
θ2 =
9− 8β
9 + 10α− 8β (3.3)
θ3 =
5
4 + 8α
(3.4)
94 Chapter 3. Hope and Anger: An Experiment on Inequality and Disruptive Behavior
Predictions for the Strong players under inequality aversion
Let us first consider the treatments without the exit option (Control treatments). It is imme-
diate to see that Strong players with β < 1/2 always play Up in both treatments. Figure B1
summarizes the predictions for inequality-averse Strong players (α ≥ β > 1/2) for both ver-
sions of the game. In the Sequential treatment, an inequality-averse Strong player (α ≥ β > 1/2)
always plays Down. In this case, the choice of the Strong players only depends on their in-
equality aversion and not on the beliefs about the Weak players. In the Simultaneous treat-
ment instead, the share of Strong players choosing Down depends on both inequality aver-
sion and beliefs about the Weak player behavior. In particular, a Strong player chooses Down
if α ≥ β > 1/2 & pright > γ1. One can see from Figure B1 that inequality averse players
that would play Down in Sequential may play Up in Simultaneous because they expect a large
enough fraction of the Weak players to play Left.
Figure B1: Predictions for inequality-averse Strong players (α ≥ β > 1/2)
pright
θ30 1
Seq DOWN DOWN
Sim
UP DOWN
Considering the treatments with the exit option, the predictions for the Strong players are
the same as for the Control treatments without the exit option. In Sequential, Strong players will
never choose to exit, since – for any value of β, with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 – the utility of Exit is 0, while
they can get a utility strictly higher than 0 by choosing Up.17 The same reasoning applies for
the Simultaneous treatment.
Predictions for the Weak players under inequality aversion
Figure B2 summarizes the predictions for inequality-averse Weak players in the Control
treatments. In the Sequential treatment, there is no value of α and β such that Weak plays Left.
In the Simultaneous treatment instead, a Weak player will play Left if β < 1/2 & pup < θ1.
Moving to the treatments where the exit option was available, Weak players’ behavior de-
pends on their sensitivity to inequality and their expectations about pup. In particular, we
17Conditional on Weak player choosing Right. If the Weak player chooses left, and β = 1 , the utility of Up would
be exactly 0.
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Figure B2: Predictions for inequality-averse Weak players (α ≥ β > 1/2) in Control treatments
pup
θ10 1
Seq RIGHT RIGHT
Sim
LEFT RIGHT
distinguish two cases based on the parameters of the utility function.
Case 1. For α <
9
22
∨ β > 22α− 9
64α− 8, the predictions are shown in Figure B3. In the Sequential
treatments, Weak players play Right unless they expect Strong players to play Up with pup >
θ3, in which case they prefer to Exit. In the Simultaneous treatments, Weak players Exit if they
expect Strong players to play Up with pup > θ3, as in Sequential. However, players with pup ≤
θ3 might play either Right or Left. If a Weak player expects Up with a low enough probability,
she would play Left. The intuition is as follows: the Weak player has a fairly good chance to
be matched with a Strong player that will choose Down and can hence exploit him by playing
Left, since it would yield 9 for the Weak player.
Figure B3: Predictions for the Weak players in Exit treatments (case 1)
pup
θ1 θ20 1
Seq RIGHT
EXIT
Sim
LEFT RIGHT EXIT
Case 2. For α >
9
22
and β <
22α− 9
64α− 8, the predictions are shown in Figure B4. The predic-
tions for the Sequential treatment are the same as in Case 1: the Weak players will play Right
if pup ≤ θ3 and Exit otherwise. For the Simultaneous treatment, Weak players choose Left if
pup ≤ θ2, and Exit otherwise. One might notice that for large enough α and small enough β,
some players that were willing to Exit in Sequential are now willing to play Left. They will
never play Right as they are very sensitive to disadvantageous inequality and hence prefer to
either Exit or try to exploit the Strong players.
To sum up:
(i) The exit option does not affect the behavior of the Strong player;
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Figure B4: Predictions for the Weak players in Exit treatments (case 2)
pup
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(ii) The fraction of Strong players playing Down in the Simultaneous treatment is smaller than
or equal to that in the Sequential treatment;
(iii) Holding expectations and preferences constant across treatments, the fraction of Weak
players playing Right in the Simultaneous treatment is smaller than in the Sequential treat-
ment. The fraction of Weak players playing Left or Exit should be larger in in the Simul-
taneous treatment compared to the Sequential treatment;
(iv) Prediction (iii) is reinforced if Weak players expect Strong players to play Up more fre-
quently in the Simultaneous treatment than in the Sequential treatment.
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3.C Instructions
Instructions18
Welcome to this study on economic decision-making. These instructions are a detailed de-
scription of the procedures we will follow. You earned e4.00 to show up on time. You can earn
additional money during the study depending on the choices you and the other participants
will make.
During the study you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. We also
ask you to switch off your mobile phone now. If you have a question at any time, please raise
your hand and remain seated: someone will come to your desk to answer it.
As we proceed with the instructions, you will be asked to answer ten questions designed to
verify your understanding of the instructions.
The study is divided into two parts. Your final earnings depend on the results of Part 1, and
the results of Part 2. You will be paid privately and in cash at the end of the study.
Your color and your team
Together with these instructions, you received a code. Codes have been randomly dis-
tributed, and determine your color, which will be either red, or blue.
Your color defines which team you belong to: the RED or the BLUE team. Each team con-
tains ten participants.
Your color and your team will remain the same throughout the whole study.
• In Part 1, you will interact exclusively with participants of your own team: if you are red,
you will only interact with other red participants, if you are blue you will only interact
with other blue participants.
• In Part 2, you will interact exclusively with participants of the other team: if you are red,
you will interact only with other blue participants, if you are blue you will only interact
with other red participants.
We will now read instructions for Part1. Instructions for Part 2 will be distributed at the end of
Part 1.
18Instructions for Sequential Exit treatment. The instructions for the other treatments are available upon request
from the authors.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
At the beginning of this Part, you will be asked to enter your code and you will learn your
color and your team.
Once teams are formed, you will perform a team task. The task is to solve some math prob-
lems to reveal what is behind the big box you will see on your screen. You will be asked to add
up three two-digit numbers. Every time a member of your team submits a correct answer, one
more piece of what is behind the box will be revealed.
If you and your team members can uncover what is behind the box in less than 150 seconds,
you will win 2 Euros each. If you fail as a team, none of your team members will earn anything.
Before we start, we would like you to answer a few questions, to verify the full understand-
ing of instructions.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
Your set
In this Part, you will always interact only with participants of the other team. Each team is
divided into two sets of 5 participants each, as illustrated in the following figure.
All participants in one set have the same color:
• if you are blue, all members in your set are blue;
• if you are red, all members in your set are red.
Your color and your set will remain the same, until the end of the study.
The Part is divided into two Phases. At the beginning of each Phase, your set will be
matched with another set of the opposite color. If you are in a blue set, you will be matched
with a red set, and vice versa:
• set Red A will play with set Blue 1 in Phase 1, and with set Blue 2 in Phase 2;
• set Red B will play with set Blue 2 in Phase 1, then with set Blue 1 in Phase 2.
In other words, in each phase, your set will be matched with a different set.
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Each Phase includes 5 rounds. Hence, Part 2 lasts 10 rounds in total.
Matching
In each round, you will be paired with a participant of the opposite color. We will call this
person your counterpart.
• If you are blue, you will be paired with a red participant of your matched set.
• If you are red, you will be paired with a blue participant of your matched set.
You will be paired with each and every participant in your matched set once and only once.
You can never be paired with the same participant twice, throughout the whole study. The
figures below illustrate an example of the pairing structure for the five rounds of each Phase.
In other words, in Part 2 you will be paired with each and every participant of the other
team once and only once.
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To see how your payoffs are determined in each round, please follow the next instructions.
The “Main Game”
In each round, you and your counterpart will play the “Main Game.” Your payoff in each
round depends on your choices and the choices of your counterpart.
If you are red, you must choose between UP and DOWN. If you are blue, you must choose
between LEFT and RIGHT.
These choices determine your payoff and the payoff of your counterpart, as displayed in
the following table:
Blue Player
Left Right
R
ed
Pl
ay
er
Up (10,0) (9,1)
Down (1,9) (5,5)
In the table, the numbers in the bottom-left corner of each cell represent the payoff of the
red person, and the numbers in the top-right corner represent the payoff of the blue person.
All payoffs are expressed in e.
This payoff table is the same for all participants.
To read the payoff corresponding to a specific pair of choices, you should
• find the row in the table that corresponds to the choice of the red person;
• move to the right to find the cell where this row crosses the column corresponding to the
choice of the blue person.
Blue moves first, and cannot condition his choice on the choice made by the red coun-
terpart. Red moves after blue, and can condition his choice on the choice made by his blue
counterpart.
Consider the case in which blue chooses LEFT.
Red can choose between UP and DOWN.
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• red chooses UP
– red earns 10;
– blue earns 0.
• If red chooses DOWN
– red earns 1;
– blue earns 9.
Consider now the case in which blue chooses RIGHT.
Red can choose between UP and DOWN.
• If red chooses UP
– red earns 9;
– blue earns 1.
• red chooses DOWN
– red earns 5;
– blue earns 5.
In practice, blue will have to answer one question:
• Which option do you choose: LEFT or RIGHT?
Red, instead, will have to answer two questions:
1. Which option do you choose if your blue counterpart selects RIGHT: UP or DOWN?
2. Which option do you choose if your blue counterpart selects LEFT: UP or DOWN?
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Only one of the two choices made by red will be implemented. If blue selects RIGHT, the
payoffs will be determined by reds answer to the first question. If blue selects LEFT, the pay-
offs will be determined by reds answer to the second question. Red will be informed about
the relevant decision only after making both choices. It is therefore important for red to pay
attention to both choices, as he does not know in advance which one will be relevant.
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The “Exit” option
In each round, you will need to take another decision, before making your choice in the
“Main Game.” You will decide whether you want to EXIT this game, or STAY.
If you select EXIT, the Main Game will not be played. Regardless of the choices made by
your counterpart, both of you will earn 0 in this round: If you choose EXIT, you do not have to
make any choice in the Main Game
If you select STAY, the payoffs in this round will depend on the decision made by your
counterpart.
• If your counterpart selects EXIT, the game will not be played. Regardless of the choices
you made, both of you will earn 0 in this round.
• If your counterpart selects STAY, the payoffs will be determined by the choices you and
your counterpart made in the Main Game.
You will be informed about the choice – to EXIT or STAY – of your counterpart only after
taking your decision in the Main Game. If your counterpart chooses EXIT, your decision will
not be relevant. Remember that you will make this choice for each round separately. In each
round, both participants in the pair will have the chance to decide whether they would like to
EXIT or STAY, before playing the Main Game, and hence before knowing the choice made by
their counterpart.
Feedback information
After each round, you will receive information on whether your counterpart selected EXIT
or STAY. In case both you and your counterpart chose STAY, you will be informed on the choice
made by your counterpart in the Main Game. If you or your counterpart (or both) chose EXIT,
you will not receive any information about the chosen option. You will also see your payoff
and the payoff of your counterpart.
After each Phase, that is after round 5 and after round 10, you will also receive information
on
• the average payoff of the members of your set over all rounds of the Phase;
• the average payoff of the members of your matched set over all rounds of the Phase;
• how frequently the participants in your set selected EXIT in all rounds of the Phase;
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• how frequently the participants in your matched set selected EXIT in all rounds of the
Phase.
Remember that in Phase 2 you can never be paired with any member of the set you were
matched with in Phase 1.
Your earnings in Part 2
At the end of Part 2, one round from each Phase will be selected, and your payoff in those
two rounds will be paid to you.
Hence, your earnings in Part 2 depend on your choices and the choices of your counterpart
in one randomly selected round of Phase 1 (rounds 1-5), and in one randomly selected round
of Phase 2 (rounds 6-10).
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—————– new set of instructions ——————
Instructions for belief elicitation sessions19
Welcome to this study on economic decision-making. These instructions are a detailed de-
scription of the procedures we will follow. You earned 4.00 to show up on time. You can earn
additional money during the study depending on the choices you make.
During the study you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. We also
ask you to switch off your mobile phone now. If you have a question at any time, please raise
your hand and remain seated: I will come to your desk to answer it.
As we proceed with the instructions, you will be asked to answer ten questions designed to
verify your understanding of the instructions. You will receive 20 cents for each question you
answer correctly at the first trial.
You will be paid privately and in cash at the end of the study.
In this experiment, you are asked to provide an estimate about decisions made by other
people who took part in a previous study. This study was conducted in Cologne, at this labo-
ratory.
Below we report the instructions we used in this previous study. We ask you to read them
on your own.
It is important that you carefully follow these instructions and fully understand the orig-
inal instructions. To verify your full understanding, we ask you to answer the same quiz we
administered to the participants who took part in the previous study. You will receive 20 cents
for each question you answer correctly at the first trial.
When everyone has completed this quiz, we will proceed and explain your task in today’s
study, and how your earnings are computed.
—————– instructions for the original experiment here ——————
19Instructions for belief elicitation for the Sequential Exit treatment. Instructions for the Simultaneous Exit treatment
are available upon request from the authors.
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Your task.
You will be asked to guess the choices made by the participants in the first round of the
previous study.
At the beginning of todays study, the computer will randomly draw the choices made in
the first round by 20 of the subjects who took part in the previous study. Of these 20 partici-
pants, 10 were assigned the role of blue players, while the other 10 were assigned the role of
red players. None of them chose to exit.
You need to answer two questions:
1. How many of the 10 blue players chose RIGHT in the first round?
2. How many of the 10 red players chose UP in the first round if their counterpart selected
RIGHT?
For both questions, your answer should be an integer number between 0 and 10.
Your earnings.
Your earnings can vary between 0 and 13 euro per question. The closer you get to the correct
answer, the higher your earnings. Please see Table 1. You earn 13 euros if your guess coincides
with the right answer, or if it departs from it by at most one unit (from above or below). If
instead your guess departs from the correct answer by 2 units, you earn 11; if it departs from
the correct answer by 3 units, you earn 8.5, and so forth and so on. If your guess departs from
the correct answer by 6 or more units you earn nothing.
Table 1: Earnings table
Distance from the correct answer Earnings
0 or 1 13
2 11
3 8.5
4 5
5 0.5
6 or more 0
You will be paid for one of the two guesses selected at random by the computer. You will
know which guess will be relevant for your payment only at the end of the experiment. It is
hence in your interest to pay attention to both decisions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions and I will come to your desk to answer
them.
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